Best v. Marino
34,680
| N.M. Ct. App. | Jun 29, 2017Background
- Steven Best (petitioner) obtained an Order of Protection (October 2012) against Camille Marino (respondent) under the Family Violence Protection Act after a special commissioner found Marino a "stalker." Marino did not object at that time.
- The Order prohibited "further acts of abuse" (defined to include "severe emotional distress") and modified the contact prohibition to bar contact "in any way . . . including social media."
- Petitioner later filed an affidavit alleging Marino used websites and social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogging) to post derogatory statements and photographs (including images implying drug use), causing him emotional harm; this produced contempt proceedings.
- At the contempt hearing, the district court focused on Marino’s online posts, found she caused Petitioner emotional distress and engaged in a sustained pattern of stalking/harassment, sentenced her to 179 days’ incarceration, and imposed an almost-complete ban on Internet/social-media use (except to contact counsel/accountant).
- On appeal, the court addressed: (1) whether Marino could collaterally attack the underlying protective order; (2) subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) whether the Order and contempt sanction impermissibly burdened Marino’s First Amendment rights; (4) sufficiency of evidence that Petitioner suffered "severe emotional distress"; and (5) whether the Internet restriction was an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Best) | Defendant's Argument (Marino) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Collateral attack on Order of Protection | Marino may not collaterally attack the original Order after contempt | The Order was invalid because stalking elements weren’t proved; it should be vacated | Court: Collateral bar rule prevents attacking the injunction after contempt; claim precluded |
| 2) Subject-matter jurisdiction | N/A (Best asserts court had jurisdiction) | District court lacked jurisdiction over contempt action | Court: District court had jurisdiction under FVPA; claim without merit |
| 3) First Amendment challenge to sanctioning online speech | Marino’s online posts are protected speech; sanctioning them violates free speech | Best: Marino was a restrained party; Order lawfully limited her speech when it caused abuse/severe emotional distress | Court: As a restrained party, Marino’s speech can be limited consistent with FVPA; sanctioning for violating the order was permissible (except as to the Internet ban) |
| 4) Sufficiency of evidence ("severe emotional distress") | Marino: posts did not cause severe emotional distress; conviction unsupported | Best: Extensive online posts and Petitioner’s testimony showed great mental harm | Court: Evidence (drug photos, insults, Petitioner’s testimony about nightmares, suicidal ideation, hijacked life) suffices beyond reasonable doubt to show severe emotional distress; contempt upheld |
| 5) Notice / Due process re: online posts as "contact" or abuse | Marino: Order was too vague to put her on notice that public online posts could violate the order | Best: Order’s modification included social media; part of Order separately prohibited abuse causing severe emotional distress | Court: Even if "contact" ambiguity exists, Part 4 (prohibition of "abuse" defined to include severe emotional distress) gave adequate notice that online posts could violate the order |
| 6) Prior restraint / Internet-access ban | Marino: near-total Internet ban is overbroad prior restraint violating First Amendment | Best: restriction reasonable to prevent recurrence; should stand or be addressed by district court | Court: The near-complete Internet ban is an unconstitutional prior restraint and not the least restrictive means; reversed the Internet restriction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bailey, 882 P.2d 57 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (applies collateral bar rule to contempt following injunction)
- Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 306 P.3d 495 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (limits on speech via injunction require addressing whether speech is unprotected; distinguished on facts)
- In re Stout, 692 P.2d 545 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (standard: criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 41 P.3d 333 (N.M. 2002) (definition: "severe emotional distress" as inability of a reasonable person to cope adequately)