Bernardo Mendia v. John Garcia
874 F.3d 1118
9th Cir.2017Background
- Mendia, a naturalized U.S. citizen, sued two ICE agents (Garcia and Chang) and DHS under Bivens and the FTCA alleging an unlawful immigration detainer while he was in county jail.
- The district court denied the agents’ qualified-immunity motion on Mendia’s Bivens claims; the agents appealed that interlocutory denial.
- While the appeal was pending, discovery proceeded on Mendia’s FTCA claims; Mendia repeatedly failed to comply with discovery orders, gave evasive deposition testimony, and ignored meet-and-confer obligations.
- The magistrate judge imposed sanctions, fined Mendia $3,500, ordered him to show cause, and on May 31 dismissed his FTCA claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
- Because the interlocutory appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the Bivens claims, defendants sought a limited remand under Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b) so the district court could apply the same sanction to the Bivens claims.
- The Ninth Circuit held that a limited remand was permissible even without a prior formal Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 motion, treated the May 31 order as an indicative ruling, retained jurisdiction, and remanded for the narrow purpose of allowing the district court to rule on applying the prior sanction to the Bivens claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a limited remand under FRAP 12.1(b) requires a prior FRCP 62.1 motion in district court | Mendia: FRCP 62.1 motion is a prerequisite; without it remand is improper | Gov’t: Remand may be ordered where the district court’s prior action adequately indicates it would grant the relief | Court: No; other circuits’ practice is persuasive—FRCP 62.1 motion not required where district court has indicated it would grant relief |
| Whether the district court’s May 31 order qualifies as an “indicative ruling” covering Bivens claims | Mendia: May 31 order did not mention Bivens claims and thus cannot be treated as indicative | Gov’t: The order said discovery failures affected all constitutional claims and struck at the core of the action, implying the same sanction would apply | Court: The May 31 order sufficiently indicates the court would apply the sanction to Bivens claims; treat it as an indicative ruling |
| Whether the court of appeals may retain jurisdiction while remanding for this limited purpose | Mendia: (implicit) remand without prior procedures would be improper and could prejudice him | Gov’t: Appellate court may remand for limited proceedings while retaining jurisdiction under FRAP 12.1(b) | Court: The Ninth Circuit will retain jurisdiction and remand for limited proceedings consistent with FRAP 12.1(b) |
| Procedural consequence of remand on the pending appeal | Mendia: (implicit) appeal should proceed; remand improper would moot issues | Gov’t: Remand appropriate; appeal should be held in abeyance | Court: Appeal held in abeyance without prejudice while district court rules on remand; parties must notify circuit clerk of district court decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (recognizing implied damages remedy for constitutional violations by federal officers)
- Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (filing a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over matters involved in the appeal)
- United States v. Cardoza, 790 F.3d 247 (1st Cir.) (treating a district court’s sua sponte resentencing action as an indicative ruling for limited remand)
- United States v. Maldonado-Rios, 790 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.) (construing a district court’s action as indicating it would grant relief and permitting limited remand)
- Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.) (remanding under FRAP 12.1 in anticipation of a district-court motion)