Bernardo Castillo v. Attorney General United States
729 F.3d 296
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Castillo, a Peruvian native, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1985 and became a permanent resident in 1990.
- In 1994 a New Jersey municipal court convicted Castillo of shoplifting under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11, with a guilty plea and fines and costs imposed.
- Castillo also had prior New Jersey theft-related convictions; he conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a).
- The IJ found Castillo removable based on a 1994 shoplifting conviction (potentially a crime involving moral turpitude) and a 1989 receiving-stolen-property conviction, ending the 7-year continuous residence.
- The BIA initially affirmed, treating the shoplifting offense as a crime and denying cancellation, leading Castillo to petition for review.
- On remand, this Court remanded to the BIA to determine whether Castillo was ‘convicted of a crime’ under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), considering Eslamizar and related standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Castillo's 1994 shoplifting conviction qualifies as a 'conviction' of a crime under §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). | Castillo argues the NJ shoplifting offense was a disorderly persons offense (not a crime) under 1994 law and thus not a 'conviction' for immigration purposes. | Castillo's shoplifting offense satisfies §1101(a)(48)(A) and constitutes a crime under §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) based on the BIA’s Eslamizar framework. | Remand for further proceedings; court adopts a broader, multi-factor ‘criminal proceeding’ approach to determine if a finding of guilt qualifies as a conviction. |
| Is the BIA's Eslamizar framework the correct basis to determine 'conviction' under §1101(a)(48)(A) and §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)? | Castillo contends the BIA violated Eslamizar or misapplied it in relying solely on the proof standard and label of guilt. | BIA followed Eslamizar’s reasoning that ‘judgment of guilt’ should be read through a criminal-proceeding lens with multiple factors. | Court endorses Castllo’s view that Eslamizar’s approach is not straightforward and remands to resolve the question with a principled, consistent reading. |
| Whether the government is entitled to Chevron deference on the BIA's interpretation of §1101(a)(48)(A) and related statutes. | Castillo argues Chevron deference should apply to the BIA's interpretation of the statute. | Government contends deference is appropriate given agencies’ statutory interpretation. | Chevron deference not warranted here; the court emphasizes inconsistent, non-uniform agency interpretations and remands for clarification. |
Key Cases Cited
- Castillo v. Attorney General, 411 F. App’x 500 (3d Cir. 2011) (discusses prior remand and the question of whether shoplifting qualifies as a crime)
- In re Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) (discusses conviciton under 1101(a)(48)(A) and military court contexts)
- In re Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004) (en banc; adopts a “criminal proceeding” reading of judgment of guilt)
- Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) (multifactor discussion of Eslamizar interpretation of guilt vs. conviction)
- In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 2012) (applies Rivera-Valencia and Eslamizar to municipal violations)
- Burrell v. Attorney General, 347 F. App’x 805 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterates that state labeling does not control 1101(a)(48)(A) analysis)
- Hussein v. United States Attorney General, 413 F. App’x 431 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished; discusses burden of proof and guilt determination)