Bernard Jones v. Rick McNeese, 746 F.3d 887

Jones, an African American, was a substance‑abuse counselor for NDOC from 1991 to 2007, and did a practicum at First Step Recovery, owned by Dr. McNeese's wife.
Jones declined a part‑time position with First Step in 1999 due to perceived racial motivation; in 2000 he again discussed part‑time work via Antlers, linked to First Step.
Jones worked at Antlers while remaining full‑time at NDOC; he later left First Step and continued with Antlers until 2008; he also pursued Healing Circle and ADCS after retirement.
Healing Circle and ADCS were funded through NDOC/Office of Probation vouchers; ADCS relied heavily on NDOC vouchers, and both eventually faced suspensions from provider lists.
Dr. McNeese, as NDOC Assistant Administrator, oversaw the voucher system and had a financial interest in First Step; he suspended ADCS from the approved list after Jones's visit to a Lincoln facility, later found to be a non‑issue by NDOC legal.
NDOC bid processes for a sole provider of outpatient services resulted in First Step initially being favored, then the process being put on hold; Dr. McNeese resigned in October 2009 amid disclosures of conflicts of interest.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jones's § 1981/§ 1983 claims were properly barred by qualified immunity	Jones argues Dr. McNeese violated rights; district court erred by not denying immunity.	McNeese contends actions were not clearly established prejudicial discrimination or stigma; qualified immunity applies.	Qualified immunity established; district court reversed and complaint dismissed.
Equal protection: whether McNeese's actions were race‑based discrimination in contract bidding	Jones claims race motivated suspension from provider list to impact NDOC bids.	McNeese asserts suspension based on HIPAA concerns, not race.	No sufficient evidence of intent to discriminate; reversed on the equal protection claim for lack of pretext.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. Supreme Court 1973) (three‑step burden‑shifting framework for discrimination)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. Supreme Court 1985) (purposes of appellate review of qualified immunity involve pure legal questions)
Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2010) (two‑part test for qualified immunity; clearly established law)
Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment on qualified immunity)
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) (reputation alone is not a due‑process liberty interest absent other harms)
Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1993) (stigmatizing statements must be sufficiently damaging to implicate a liberty interest)
Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 1994) (scope of stigma required for due‑process claims in employment contexts)
Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996) (pretext evidence needed to show intentional discrimination in § 1981/§ 1983 claims)
Twiggs v. Selig, 679 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2012) (insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination defeats § 1981/§ 1983 claim)
Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2002) (pretext and discrimination analysis in § 1983 cases)