Bernadean Rittmann v. amazon.com, Inc.
971 F.3d 904
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background
- Amazon Flex (AmFlex) contracts independent contractors to perform “last mile” deliveries using a smartphone app; drivers pick up packages at Amazon warehouses and deliver to customers, sometimes but not typically across state lines.
- Plaintiff Raef Lawson signed AmFlex’s Terms of Service (TOS) containing an arbitration clause and did not timely opt out; three other named plaintiffs did opt out.
- Plaintiffs brought federal and state wage-and-hour claims; Amazon moved to compel arbitration as to Lawson.
- The district court denied the motion, concluding AmFlex drivers fall within the FAA § 1 transportation-worker exemption (contracts of employment of ‘‘any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’’) and that, because the TOS specified the FAA for Section 11, no clear governing law applied to salvage the arbitration clause.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: AmFlex delivery providers are exempt under § 1 even if they do not themselves cross state lines; the arbitration clause cannot be enforced under federal law or Washington law.
- Judge Bress dissented, arguing the § 1 exemption should cover only classes of workers who themselves cross state lines in the course of deliveries.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AmFlex delivery providers fall within FAA § 1 transportation-worker exemption | AmFlex drivers are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce because they deliver packages that originated out of state | AmFlex drivers perform local intrastate work; exemption requires that workers themselves cross state lines | Drivers are exempt under § 1 even if they do not personally cross state lines; packages remain in the stream of interstate commerce until delivery (affirmed) |
| Whether the phrase “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” requires crossing state lines | Not required; focus is on whether workers’ duties are part of interstate movement | Required; ‘‘engaged in’’ means workers must belong to a class that crosses state lines | Court interprets ‘‘engaged in’’ to include last-mile workers who complete deliveries of goods shipped interstate; crossing state lines by the individual is not required |
| Whether parties’ choice-of-law clause (Section 11 governed by the FAA and federal law) can make the FAA applicable despite § 1 exemption | Section 11’s choice-of-FAA cannot override § 1; the FAA does not apply where § 1 exempts the contract | The parties contracted for FAA/federal-law governance of Section 11, so arbitration should be enforceable | Choice-of-FAA provision cannot breathe life into the FAA where § 1 exempts the employment contracts; no applicable federal law can enforce arbitration |
| Whether Washington law or severability can save the arbitration provision | Washington law could govern Section 11 if the FAA is inapplicable; severability should allow Washington law to apply | The TOS’s governing-law clause expressly makes Section 11 governed by the FAA; severing only the FAA reference would not leave Section 11 governed by Washington law | Court declines to rewrite the contract; ambiguous intent construed against drafter (Amazon); no clear state-law basis to enforce arbitration, so arbitration agreement is invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (§ 1 is a narrow exemption covering only employment contracts of transportation workers)
- New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (ordinary-meaning approach to FAA text; use contemporary dictionaries)
- Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (delivery drivers with national-service contracts fall within § 1)
- Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004) (supervisors of package-delivery operations may be ‘‘so closely related’’ to interstate transport as to be part of it)
- Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (§ 1 can apply to passenger-transport workers if they are engaged in interstate commerce or work so closely related to it as to be practically part of it)
- Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2005) (employees only tangentially related to interstate movement are not covered)
- Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (courts interpret § 1 to cover workers actually engaged in moving goods in interstate commerce)
- Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) (‘‘engaged in commerce’’ indicates actors within the flow of interstate commerce)
- United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975) (‘‘in commerce’’ means direct engagement in production, distribution, or acquisition in interstate commerce)
- A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (discusses when goods have ‘‘come to rest’’ and are no longer in interstate commerce)
