612 S.W.3d 280
Tex.2020Background
- Berkel subcontracted to drill foundation pilings on a Skanska site; Tyler Lee (Skanska superintendent) was struck by falling steel "leads" after a crane collapsed and later had his leg amputated.
- Berkel employees were covered by Skanska’s contractor-controlled workers’ compensation program; Lee received compensation benefits and sued Berkel asserting negligent, grossly negligent, and intentional-injury claims under the common-law exception to the Act.
- At trial the jury was asked whether a Berkel employee "believed injury was substantially certain to result" (a broad formulation); the jury answered yes and awarded damages.
- The court of appeals reversed for legal insufficiency, adopting a localized-area gloss on the substantial-certainty test (requiring substantial certainty of harm to a particular victim or small class in a localized area), and initially rendered judgment for Berkel.
- On rehearing the court of appeals remanded for a new trial in the interest of justice because it had adopted a new definition of intent.
- The Texas Supreme Court held the trial charge misstated the law, reaffirmed that the substantial-certainty test requires knowledge that conduct was substantially certain to injure a particular employee, found the evidence legally insufficient, reversed the remand, and rendered judgment for Berkel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence satisfied the substantial‑certainty intentional‑injury exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act | Lee: Berkel’s conduct was substantially certain to cause injury (or someone would be injured); applies even if not targeted at a specific employee | Berkel: Texas requires belief that conduct is substantially certain to injure a particular employee | Held: No. Texas requires substantial certainty of injury to a particular employee; evidence was insufficient to show Berkel knew it would injure Lee |
| Whether the jury charge’s definition of intent was legally correct | Lee: Charge proper—need only find belief that injury was substantially certain to result (need not be tied to a specific victim) | Berkel: Charge was erroneous; must require knowledge it would injure the particular plaintiff | Held: Charge erroneous; it omitted the required particular‑victim specificity under Reed Tool and Mo‑Vac |
| Whether transferred intent (knowing injury to someone) suffices to establish intentional‑injury exception | Lee: Transferred intent applies—knowing injury to someone can substitute for knowing injury to a particular victim | Berkel: Transferred intent does not rescue the claim absent evidence someone was known to be the likely victim | Held: Even assuming transfer applies, no evidence showed anyone believed his act was substantially certain to injure any particular person |
| Whether remand in the interest of justice was appropriate after court of appeals adopted a new localized‑area test | Lee: Remand justified so plaintiffs can present evidence under clarified standard | Berkel: Remand improper—law unchanged and plaintiffs were on notice of the correct specificity requirement | Held: Remand improper; no intervening change in law and plaintiffs had opportunity to present specific‑victim evidence; Supreme Court reversed remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985) (established that employer must believe its conduct is substantially certain to cause injury to a particular employee)
- Mo‑Vac Serv. Co. v. Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. 2020) (reaffirmed Reed Tool’s particular‑victim substantial‑certainty test)
- Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 185 S.W. 556 (Tex. 1916) (origin of the common‑law intentional‑injury exception to workers’ compensation)
- Medina v. Zuniga, 593 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. 2019) (summary of gross‑negligence standard distinguishing conscious indifference from intentional harm)