Bergin v. Texas Beef Group
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2271
| Tex. App. | 2011Background
- Texas Beef operates Palo Duro Feedlot in Hansford County and Bergins lived about 2 miles away until 1995.
- Bergins claimed nuisance from dust and emissions starting in 1988, and Texas Beef sued in Randall County in 1995 seeking a declaration that nuisance claims were barred by a statutory repose.
- Bergins filed a Hansford County action in 1995 alleging damages from Texas Beef's failure to control emissions; Hansford stayed pending Randall County action.
- Bergins moved to transfer venue to Hansford County; trial court denied the transfer in 1995.
- Texas Beef moved for and obtained a 2009 summary judgment seeking declaratory relief that nuisance actions were barred by § 251.004, but the issue of venue remained.
- The appellate court concluded venue was proper in Hansford County and reversed to transfer the case there.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue was proper in Randall County for this declaratory action | Bergins contends venue lay in Hansford; receipt of nuisance correspondence in Randall County is irrelevant. | Texas Beef argues Randall County is proper because most partners reside there and communications were received there. | Venue improper in Randall; transfer to Hansford warranted. |
| Whether § 251.004(a) repose bars the nuisance action | Bergins’ claims allege ongoing nuisance; repose applies if operations existed substantially unchanged. | Texas Beef asserts repose applies to the threatened/pending actions as of established operation date. | Court does not decide merits of repose; focuses on venue and accrual analysis, remanding for transfer. |
| What governs venue for declaratory judgment actions in this context | Beadle/Bonham framework; accrual location governs venue for declaratory relief seeking verdict on nuisance status. | Beadle/Applied Chem. Magnesias guide proper venue for declaratory relief; accrual not tethered to nuisance action location alone. | Venue determined by where the cause accrues; here, accrual favors Hansford, requiring transfer. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995) (venue for declaratory judgments controlled by accrual of the cause)
- In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. 2006) (essence/nature of declaratory suit controls venue)
- Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 276 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. 1955) (controlling issue in declaratory judgment venue analysis)
- Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003) (Agriculture Code § 251.004 two conditions for repose)
- Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005) (application of § 251.004 to nuisance claims)
- Commercial State Bank v. Algeo, 331 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1959) (definition of cause of action for accrual purposes)
- Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993) (relevance to venue review standards)
- Russell v. Panhandle Producing Co., 975 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998) (venue transfer considerations in Amarillo proxy)
- Garrison v. Morrow, 300 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1957) (nature and dominant purpose of declaratory actions control venue)