Bergeron v. State
60 So. 3d 212
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Bergeron appeals a circuit court denial of post-conviction relief challenging his habitual-offender sentence.
- Indictment (2002) charged murder, possession of a stolen vehicle, and possession of a deadly weapon as a felon, alleging habitual-offender status under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 based on two Georgia 1993 convictions.
- The two Georgia convictions were burglary and theft by taking, alleged to arise from a single incident where Bergeron broke into a car dealership, stole keys, and drove away a vehicle.
- Bergeron pled guilty to weapon possession and stolen property; sentences run consecutively with agreed terms; a jury convicted him of manslaughter in 2002 and sentenced him to 20 years, enhanced by habitual-offender status.
- Direct appeal upheld the conviction; in 2009 the Mississippi Supreme Court granted PCR on the sole habitual-offender issue; circuit court then denied PCR.
- The court reviews the habitual-offender designation de novo and concludes the record does not support treatment of the two Georgia felonies as separate incidents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the two prior Georgia felonies qualify as separate incidents | Bergeron contends the Georgia offenses arose from one incident and thus cannot support habitual status. | State argues prior offenses may qualify if part of a continuing unlawful scheme and satisfy separate-incidents requirement. | Two Georgia convictions did not arise from separate incidents; not sufficient for habitual-offender status. |
| Whether the guilty-plea convictions can support habitual status if the Georgia convictions fail | Bergeron asserts Georgia convictions must be counted; plea convictions cannot be used if not separate incidents. | State contends the plea convictions could still support habitual status if properly counted. | Plea convictions arose from the same incident as the manslaughter; not counted for habitual status. |
| Whether the record shows Bergeron consented to habitual-offender status | Bergeron did not overtly consent; record lacks transcript of the guilty-plea hearing clarifying consent. | State argues whatever agreement exists in the sentencing proceedings is sufficient. | Record lacks explicit consent; cannot rely on implied agreement to sustain habitual status. |
| Proper remedy if habitual-offender status is unsupported | Not explicitly argued beyond lack of support for status. | If status unsupported, re-sentencing is required. | Reverse and remand for re-sentencing consistent with the opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. State, 511 So.2d 1354 (Miss. 1987) (prior separate-incidents rule for habitual offender status)
- Pittman v. State, 570 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 1990) (guidance on when separate offenses count as separate incidents)
- Riddle v. State, 413 So.2d 737 (Miss. 1982) (offenses arising from a single nucleus of operative facts not separate incidents)
- Walls v. State, 759 So.2d 483 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (two predicate offenses may arise from a single incident and not qualify as separate)
- Otis v. State, 853 So.2d 856 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (same-nucleus-of-facts analysis for habitual offender)
- Garrison v. State, 950 So.2d 990 (Miss. 2006) (two prior convictions with two separate victims and separate intents may be separate offenses)
- Davis v. State, 850 So.2d 176 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (poll of incidents respecting separate victims and later-time offenses)
- Bergeron v. State, 913 So.2d 997 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (direct-appeal backdrop on habitual-offender issue (cited for procedural posture))