597 U.S. 179
SCOTUS2022Background
- In 2018 North Carolina amended its Constitution to require in‑person voters to present photo ID; the General Assembly enacted S.B. 824, the Governor vetoed it, and the legislature overrode the veto.
- The NAACP sued the Governor and State Board of Elections (Board) alleging S.B. 824 violated the Federal Constitution; the Attorney General (independently elected) defended the Board.
- The Speaker and President Pro Tempore (legislative leaders) moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), citing a North Carolina statute that authorizes them to intervene as agents of the State to defend state law.
- The District Court denied intervention (applying a presumption that existing state defendants adequately represented the State) and later granted a preliminary injunction; appellate panels split and the Fourth Circuit en banc denied intervention applying a “heightened presumption.”
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit splits and held the legislative leaders were entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the legislative leaders satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest prong | Leaders assert state statute makes them agents of the State with a protectable interest in defending S.B. 824 | Board/NAACP say leaders are not named parties and plaintiffs sued only officers; state law shouldn’t automatically create intervention rights | Court: State statute authorizing leaders to intervene suffices; interest prong met (States may allocate representation among officials) |
| Whether existing parties adequately represent the leaders’ interest (adequacy prong) | Leaders point to Board’s tepid defense, AG’s past opposition, Governor’s veto — existing parties may not adequately protect the State’s interest | Board/NAACP invoke a presumption that existing state defendants (and AG) adequately represent the State and thus bar intervention | Court: A presumption against intervention is inappropriate where a duly authorized state agent seeks to intervene; leaders met the minimal burden and adequacy was not shown |
| Whether state law can dictate intervention rights or adequacy | Leaders: federal courts should defer to State’s choice of its agents to defend state law | NAACP/Dissent: adequacy is governed by federal law; allowing state law to control would invite many intervenors and burden courts | Court: Federal courts must respect a State’s designation of agents; state law is dispositive for the interest inquiry and weighs heavily against presumptions of adequacy here (but federal adequacy inquiry still applies) |
| Remedy / scope | Leaders seek intervention as of right (also asked alternatively for permissive intervention) | Defendants urged denial; district court had denied intervention | Court reversed the Fourth Circuit en banc and held leaders are entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2); no need to decide permissive intervention |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (suits against state officers to enjoin enforcement of state law circumvent sovereign immunity)
- Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (intervenor’s burden is minimal; related but nonidentical interests justify intervention)
- Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (legislative leaders authorized under state law may represent the State in federal court)
- Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (state law may provide officials other than the attorney general authority to speak for the State)
- Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (States have a legitimate interest in enforcement of their statutes)
- Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (States define themselves as sovereigns by structuring government authority)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (misunderstanding of applicable law can constitute reversible error on discretionary review)