Berezyuk v. State, 407 P.3d 512

Dec. 2013: Wasilla police found Yuri Berezyuk slumped in a car; officer observed drug paraphernalia, the driver fled, and a sunglasses case later recovered contained 14 grams of heroin and a digital scale; the driver initially identified himself as his brother Ivan.
Yuri was indicted for second-degree misconduct (possession with intent to distribute), fourth-degree misconduct (simple possession), and several misdemeanors including false identification.
Prosecutor sought to admit Yuri’s 2004 conviction for possession with intent to distribute (~320 grams of heroin) to prove intent to distribute in the 2014 case.
The superior court allowed the prior conviction under the Bingaman test (a character-evidence framework), and the prosecutor argued the prior conviction to the jury as proof Yuri was an “established drug dealer.”
Jury convicted on all counts; on appeal the Court of Appeals held the superior court applied the wrong evidentiary standard, that the prosecutor’s use of the prior conviction was propensity/character evidence, and that its admission was prejudicial as to the intent-to-distribute charge.
Result: conviction for second-degree misconduct (intent to distribute) reversed; conviction for fourth-degree simple possession and misdemeanors (including false identification) affirmed; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Issue	Berezyuk's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior conviction to prove intent	Prior conviction was improper character/propensity evidence and should be excluded under Rules 404(b)(1) and 403	Prior conviction is relevant to intent and non-propensity defenses (defense claimed drugs belonged to brother)	Trial court erred by applying Bingaman (character-evidence test) instead of performing a 404(b)(1)/403 analysis; admission prejudiced intent-to-distribute conviction and requires reversal
Use of limiting instruction	Limiting instruction was inadequate to prevent misuse as propensity evidence	Limiting instruction sufficed; any error was harmless because evidence of intent was overwhelming	Instruction was insufficient given prosecutor’s overt propensity arguments; error was not harmless for intent-to-distribute charge
Harmlessness as to simple possession charge	Admission of prior conviction requires reversal of all drug convictions	Evidence of possession itself was overwhelming, so any error was harmless on simple possession	Error harmless as to simple possession; conviction for fourth-degree misconduct affirmed
Admission of post-arrest false-ID incidents for false-information charge	Evidence of two other false-ID encounters was improper character evidence	Even if improper, the error was harmless because proof of false ID was overwhelming and no real defense was offered	Any error was harmless; conviction for giving false information affirmed

Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398 (Alaska App. 2003) (test addressing admissibility of prior domestic-violence acts offered as character evidence under Rule 404(b)(4))
Willock v. State, 400 P.3d 124 (Alaska App. 2017) (explaining that a judge must identify a non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b)(1) rather than simply reciting listed purposes)
Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969) (harmless-error standard cited for assessing whether improper evidence requires reversal)