Beres v. United States
104 Fed. Cl. 408
Fed. Cl.2012Background
- Railroad right-of-way along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, WA, originated under the 1875 Act, SLS & E Deeds, and a 1904 Reeves Quit Claim Deed, with subsequent prescriptive easement; all are contending easements rather than fee interests.
- Patents and deeds show the 1892 Cowie patent covered land subject to the railroad easement, implying continued encumbrance but not ownership transfer.
- The STB allowed railbanking and interim trail use (NITU) after abandoning the line, creating a recreational trail over the corridor.
- Washington state and federal authorities have previously determined the deeds conveyed easements to the railroad, not fee simple interests, for location, construction, and operation of the railroad.
- This opinion resolves the limited cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the scope of those easements, focusing on whether trail use exceeds the original grant scope under the 1875 Act, SLS & E Deeds, Reeves Quit Claim Deed, and prescriptive easement.
- If trail use exceeds the scope, a Fifth Amendment taking may have occurred; if within scope, no taking. The court finds trail use exceeds the scope in all applicable deeds and easements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of easements under SLS & E Deeds | Easements limited to railroad purposes | Trail use falls within scope via broad grant | Trail use outside scope; takings potential |
| Scope of the Reeves Quit Claim Deed | Reeves deed limited to railroad right of way | Trail use within scope remains possible | Reeves deed scope exceeded by trail use; takings potential |
| Scope of the prescriptive easement | Prescriptive easement confined to railroad-related use | Trail use within prescriptive easement | Prescriptive easement scope exceeded by trail use; takings potential |
| Scope under the 1875 Act easements | Easements limited to railroad purposes only | Trail use permissible under broad right of way | 1875 Act easements limited to railroad purposes; trail use exceeds scope; takings potential |
| Railbanking and Trails Act effect | Railbanking preserves future rail use, not take | Railbanking within scope of 1875 Act grant | Railbanking and interim trail use exceed scope of easements; takings potential |
Key Cases Cited
- Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (Trail use takings framework; scope depends on original easement)
- Preseault II, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (Scope of easements; three-part rail-to-trails inquiry)
- Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2009) (Trail conversion not per se taking; scope of easement matters)
- Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Gov’t use beyond grant triggers taking; rail-to-trail scope analysis)
- Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed.Cir. 2010) (Rail-to-trails takings: trail use outside scope = taking)