Bereatha Kyle-Eiland v. Albert Neff, 408 F. App'x 933

Kyle-Eiland, an African-American at-will OSU employee, was terminated in May 2007 after a period of performance concerns and restructuring of her role.
She transferred to the College of Education and Human Ecology and the Center for Learning Excellence (CLEX) under dual supervision, with Neff supervising CLEX and Stump supervising EHE during split workdays.
Neff repeatedly criticized Kyle-Eiland’s financial reports as not in the requested format and expressed concerns about her interpersonal skills; Kyle-Eiland disputed the format and training.
In August 2006 Neff issued a performance improvement plan (PIP); by November 2006 a second PIP discussion occurred, and Kyle-Eiland filed OCRC charges alleging retaliation for prior complaints.
Kyle-Eiland alleged that Neff’s actions, including the PIP, scheduling training with a predecessor, and delays in meetings, were retaliatory and discriminated against her; she also faced changes in funding and access following a merger.
The district court granted summary judgment for Neff; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no administrative exhaustion for certain charges and no prima facie case or pretext evidence supporting retaliation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kyle-Eiland exhausted administrative remedies	Kyle-Eiland argues exhaustion satisfied for EEOC/OCRC charges.	Defendant contends some charges were unexhausted as to right-to-sue and time limits.	Exhaustion lacking for some claims; those claims dismissed.
Whether Kyle-Eiland established a prima facie Title VII retaliation case	Kyle-Eiland asserts protected activity and causal link via timing and scrutiny.	Neff did not know of protected activity; no causal nexus shown.	No prima facie case established.
Whether the PIP and related actions constitute an adverse employment action	PIP and heightened scrutiny were actionable adverse actions.	PIP alone does not always equal adverse action absent tangible impact; context matters.	PIP could constitute adverse action but overall evidence failed to show linkage to retaliation.
Whether there was a causal connection between protected activity and the adverse action	Temporal proximity and heightened scrutiny after complaints show causation.	No evidence Neff knew of OCRC complaints; timing insufficient.	No causal connection proven.
Whether Neff’s stated reasons were pretextual	District court relied on pretext in the lack of progressive discipline and inconsistent reporting.	Non-discriminatory reasons (reporting quality, misconduct) adequately explain termination.	No material pretext shown; summary judgment affirmed.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issues of material fact in summary judgment)
Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (burden-shifting framework for Title VII discrimination cases)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes the pretext framework after prima facie case)
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (definitions of adverse employment actions beyond petty slights)
Hamilton v. General Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2009) (temporal proximity plus heightened scrutiny can support prima facie case)
Mickey v. Zeider Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action matters)