Bentrud v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C.
794 F.3d 871
7th Cir.2015Background
- Bentrud incurred $10,955.20 on a Capital One credit card; Bowman Heintz filed suit in Hendricks County Superior Court to collect.
- Bentrud invoked the card’s arbitration provision; the state court stayed the case and gave him 30 days to initiate arbitration, with the stay to dissolve automatically if he failed to do so.
- AAA declined to administer the arbitration; Bentrud did not secure an arbitrator and missed the 30-day deadline, so the stay dissolved.
- Over one month after the deadline, Bowman Heintz filed a second motion for summary judgment in state court; Bentrud later obtained an extension and arbitration proceeded.
- Bentrud sued Bowman Heintz in federal court under the FDCPA alleging: (1) the second summary-judgment filing was an unfair or unconscionable debt-collection practice (15 U.S.C. §1692f), and (2) Bowman Heintz misrepresented or sought unauthorized interest (15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692f(1)) because Capital One statements showed APR 13.9% but the complaint alleged 10.65%.
- Record showed Capital One changed the APR from 13.9% (with a “D” prime-rate designation) to 10.65% effective May 17, 2011; district court granted summary judgment for Bowman Heintz and this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing a second motion for summary judgment after plaintiff elected arbitration violated §1692f (unfair practices) | Filing the second motion after Bentrud elected arbitration was unfair/unconscionable collection conduct | Filing was proper after stay dissolved; state-court procedures and duty of diligence justified resuming litigation | Court held no §1692f violation; FDCPA not a vehicle to enforce arbitration provision and state-court stay had dissolved |
| Whether averring 10.65% APR in complaint misrepresented the debt in violation of §1692e | Complaint’s 10.65% contradicted Capital One statements showing 13.9%, so misrepresentation | Capital One changed APR to 10.65% as of May 17, 2011; complaint matched records and affidavit | Court held no §1692e violation; no evidence Bowman Heintz misrepresented rate |
| Whether collecting at 10.65% was collecting an amount not authorized by agreement (§1692f(1)) | If 13.9% was correct, then collecting at 10.65% was unauthorized | Card expressly allowed rate changes; evidence shows legitimate rate reduction to 10.65% | Court held no §1692f(1) violation; rate change was authorized and supported by records |
| Whether district court improperly drew adverse inference against plaintiff at summary judgment | District court improperly inferred change was legally valid against non-movant | Capital One (not a party) supported the 10.65% rate; Bowman Heintz’s conduct lacked evidence of FDCPA violation | Court held no impermissible adverse inference; plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue against Bowman Heintz |
Key Cases Cited
- Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting §1692f claim that sought to enforce other positive-law protections through the FDCPA)
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (treating lawyers who regularly collect debts as "debt collectors" under the FDCPA)
- Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2013) (standard on drawing inferences on summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment and genuine-issue-of-material-fact standards)
- Hanover Insurance Co. v. North Building Co., 751 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of summary judgment)