269 P.3d 1079
Wash. Ct. App.2012Background
- Tammy Bennett sued Seattle Mental Health, Dr. Fine, and Albertsons for the wrongful death of her 26-year-old developmentally disabled son, Shawn Manning.
- Shawn, diagnosed with severe autistic disorder and mental retardation, was legally incapacitated and thereafter cared for in state-supervised settings; Bennett sought guardianship monitoring when he turned 18.
- The Bennetts’ guardianship and Shawn’s care were funded by disability benefits paid to Shawn’s care provider, SAW, with Bennett claiming rights to oversee medical decisions.
- Shawn died on October 21, 2004; Bennett filed a wrongful death action on December 19, 2007, alleging negligent prescribing and supervision by the respondents.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action for lack of standing under RCW 4.24.010 and for noncompliance with RCW 7.70.100 filing requirements; the matter then appealed.
- Washington appellate courts, following Waples v. Yi, considered whether the parent of a developmentally disabled adult could recover under RCW 4.24.010, given the statute’s dependence requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 4.24.010 allows Bennett to sue for her incapacitated adult son's death | Bennett argues Shawn should be treated like a minor for purposes of the statute. | Defendants contend only dependent parents of adult children may sue; Shawn was not a minor and Bennett was not financially dependent. | Bennett lacks standing; RCW 4.24.010 requires financial dependence for adult children. |
| Whether RCW 4.24.010 is unconstitutional as applied | Statute discriminates against parents of incapacitated adults without rational basis. | Classification is rational; adults differ from minors and dependence differs accordingly. | Statute survives rational-basis review; no unconstitutional application. |
| Whether the age-of-majority definition affects the minor/adult distinction in RCW 4.24.010 | Shawn’s status as developmentally disabled and legally incapacitated should treat him as a minor for purposes of the statute. | Age of majority is 18; Philippides limits recovery to dependent adults regardless of incapacity; not a minor for purposes of the statute. | RCW 26.28.010 applies; a developmentally disabled adult is not a minor under RCW 4.24.010. |
| Whether the legislature intended to extend 4.24.010 to incapacitated adults | Legislature signaled broader protection for certain involved parents; should include incapacitated adults. | Intent section limited to minors; broader extension would require legislative action. | Legislature did not extend to incapacitated adults; amendments required. |
| Whether any constitutional equal-protection concerns undermine 4.24.010 | Practically excludes certain caretakers of incapacitated adults; unconstitutional burden. | Classification serves legitimate state interest in compensating those most affected. | Rational-basis review upheld; no constitutional violation found. |
Key Cases Cited
- Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash.2d 376 ((2004)) (limited minor-child intent to minors; requires financial dependence for adult children)
- Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash.App. 624 ((1990)) (dependent for support means financial dependence; rational basis for distinction)
- Waples v. Yi, 169 Wash.2d 152 ((2010)) (held RCW 7.70.100 filing requirements unconstitutional)
- Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351 ((1920)) (older authority cited regarding financial obligations and damages context)
- Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash.App. 765 ((1999)) (illustrates limitations of beneficiaries under the statute)
- Burt v. Ross, 43 Wash.App. 129 ((1986)) (age majority and application of RCW 4.24.010 considerations)
- Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 161 Wash.2d 372 ((2007)) (general principle about wrongful death actions as statutory creations)