Bennett v. Estate of James Kelly King, 875 S.E.2d 46

Testatrix Jacquelin K. Stevenson died 2007; her will devised Lake Summit to two sons who later forfeited their inheritances after looting the estate. Two after-acquired unimproved lots (Bailey's Island, Paradise Island) passed via the residuary.
Residuary clause gave the residuary estate "in equal shares" to six named beneficiaries; only three beneficiaries remained involved here: two daughters (petitioners, who are also personal representatives) and a stepdaughter (respondent Felder).
Section 10.6 of the will grants personal representatives broad powers to distribute estate property "without the consent of any beneficiary" and "without making pro-rata distributions of specific assets."
Petitioners had the three residuary properties appraised and proposed a division equal in monetary value but allocating most of Lake Summit to themselves and more of Bailey's Island to Felder; Felder objected as inequitable and a breach of fiduciary duty.
Probate court ordered pro rata (equal ownership) division of each property; circuit court and court of appeals affirmed, finding the proposed allocation inequitable and that Section 10.6 did not apply to the residuary.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed: it held Section 10.6 applies to the residuary, personal representatives may distribute non-pro rata absent a breach, and Felder failed to show the proposed equal-value distribution was unfair; case remanded to approve the proposed distribution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Petitioners)	Defendant's Argument (Felder)	Held
Does Section 10.6's broad grant of distribution power apply to the residuary estate?	Yes — it authorizes non-pro rata distributions of residuary property.	No — Section 10.6 governs only specific devises, not the residuary.	Yes — Section 10.6 applies to residuary distributions and must be harmonized with residuary clause.
Did Petitioners breach their fiduciary duty by proposing the allocation?	No — the distribution is equal in monetary value and authorized by the will.	Yes — allocation favors Petitioners, ignores intangibles (income, sentimental value), and is self‑dealing.	No breach proved — beneficiary bore burden to show unfairness and did not do so; proposed plan upheld.
Proper standard of appellate review: "any evidence" v. de novo?	Action on will construction → "any evidence" standard.	Seeking specific property/equitable relief → de novo.	Court used de novo (action characterized as equitable here) but said result would be same under either standard.
Did a prior settlement agreement limit the personal representatives' discretion?	No — agreement simply provided to return to probate if parties disagreed.	Yes — agreement curtailed their discretion.	No — agreement did not eliminate will-granted discretion.

Epworth Children's Home v. Beasley, 365 S.C. 157, 616 S.E.2d 710 (S.C. 2005) (will-construction principles; interpret will as whole)
Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 690 S.E.2d 771 (S.C. 2010) (distinguishing legal vs. equitable actions by "main purpose" test)
Bennett v. Carter, 421 S.C. 374, 807 S.E.2d 197 (S.C. 2017) (background decision detailing co-trustees' theft that defeated original dispositions)
Turpin v. Lowther, 404 S.C. 581, 745 S.E.2d 397 (Ct. App. 2013) (examples of fiduciary breaches by personal representatives)
Wheeler v. Estate of Green, 381 S.C. 548, 673 S.E.2d 836 (Ct. App. 2009) (personal representative acting in good faith may be upheld)
Lesesne v. Lesesne, 307 S.C. 67, 413 S.E.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1991) (fiduciary may not use position to benefit self at others' expense)