Benedict G. Wenske and Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah Ealy
13-15-00012-CV
| Tex. App. | May 22, 2015Background
- Appellants (Benedict and Elizabeth Wenske) appeal a trial judgment concerning interpretation of a deed conveying mineral rights to Appellees (Steve and Deborah Ealy).
- Deed contains a granting clause that conveys the Property "subject to the Reservations from Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty." (Granting clause quoted in brief.)
- A prior non-participating royalty interest (an outstanding reservation) exists that Appellants contend remains a burden on the estate conveyed to Appellees.
- Appellees argue the deed language does not transmit the burden of that prior reserved royalty to their conveyed interests and that additional, unequivocal language was required to do so.
- Appellants counter that the granting clause incorporates the reservations/exceptions and thus the conveyed estate is subject to the previously reserved royalty; they seek reversal and rendition in their favor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the deed's granting clause incorporates prior reservations/exceptions so the burden of a reserved non-participating royalty passes to the grantee | Wenske: Granting clause explicitly makes conveyance subject to Reservations and Exceptions; the grant is therefore burdened by the prior reservation | Ealy: Only the Reservations/Exceptions paragraphs matter; the grant should not be construed to transmit the burden without more explicit language | Wenske position: The grant, read in its four corners, is subject to the reservations/exceptions and thus the burden passes; deed should be construed accordingly |
| Whether grantor was required to use additional, unequivocal language to transmit the burden of the prior reserved royalty | Wenske: No additional language required; the grant expressly made subject to reservations excises the need for further phrasing | Ealy: Appellants failed to use supplemental language to negate traditional deed-construction rules; therefore burden does not pass | Wenske position: No authority supports requiring extra language; the existing phrasing suffices to impose the burden |
| Whether Bass v. Harper controls and mandates a different outcome | Wenske: Bass is controlling and analogous; distinctions raised by Ealy are immaterial | Ealy: Facts differ from Bass (e.g., Bass deed lacked a reservation and used specific conveyancing phrasing) so Bass is inapposite | Wenske position: Bass applies more closely than Ealy’s cited cases and supports finding the burden passes |
| Whether other cases cited by Ealy (Pich, Plainsman, Graham, Selman) mandate a contrary result | Wenske: Those cases are distinguishable on facts and legal issues; some relied-on language is dicta or addresses different property interests | Ealy: Relies on those cases to argue prior reservation should not be proportionately carved or to support requiring explicit transmission language | Wenske position: The cited authorities do not override the deed’s plain language; the grantor retains full benefit of reservation and the grantee takes subject to it |
Key Cases Cited
- Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986) (recognizes grantor rights incident to reserved mineral/royalty interests)
- Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1969) (governs conveyance/reservation interaction relied on by appellants)
- Pich v. Langford, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957) (addresses characterization of prior reservations as mineral vs. royalty interests; contains dicta on proportional carving)
- Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1995) (involves ownership questions of specific mineral deposits; distinguishable)
- Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013) (addresses whether a royalty reservation is fixed or floating; factually distinguishable)
- Selman v. Bristow, 402 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1966) (applies Duhig-type analysis where grantor failed to disclose outstanding reservation; fact-specific and distinguishable)
Requested relief: reversal and rendition in favor of Appellants (deed construed to leave grantees subject to the prior reserved 3/8 royalty).