Benavides v. Eastern New Mexico Medical Center, 338 P.3d 1265

Nurse Sara Benavides slipped on a recently mopped hospital floor in 2006, suffering serious injuries and receiving maximum temporary total disability benefits.
Employer (Eastern New Mexico Medical Center) had policies and provided multiple “wet floor” signs on housekeeping carts but no sign was posted at the room where the nurse fell.
WCJ found wet-floor signs to be safety devices, that Employer supplied them, but concluded Employer provided all appropriate safety devices and denied the 10% statutory enhancement.
Court of Appeals affirmed based on Jaramillo (manhole cover case), treating nondeployment by a coworker as controlling; Worker appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered whether a “wet floor” sign is a safety device in general use, whether Employer’s failure to supply/deploy it entitles Worker to a 10% increase under NMSA § 52-1-10(B), and whether § 52-5-1 violates separation of powers.

Issue	Benavides' Argument	Eastern NM Med Ctr's Argument	Held
Is a “wet floor” sign a "safety device" under § 52-1-10(B)?	A wet-floor sign is a tangible device that warns and lessens the specific danger of slipping.	Signs promote safety but are not "safety devices" like machine guards.	Yes — a wet-floor sign is a tangible safety device that lessens a specific danger and may be in general use.
Does Employer’s possession but nondeployment of signs satisfy the statute’s requirement to "supply" safety devices (i.e., bar the 10% increase)?	Mere availability in carts is insufficient; employer must ensure devices are supplied and properly employed.	Providing signs to custodians satisfies the duty to "supply"; employer is not insurer of employee safety; Jaramillo controls.	No — Employer failed to supply (i.e., ensure deployment/use of) the sign at the hazard; Worker entitled to 10% increase under § 52-1-10(B).
Does § 52-5-1 (legislative statement limiting "liberal construction") violate separation of powers?	Argues interpretation is judicial function and § 52-5-1 undermines liberal-construction precedent.	Statute is valid and interpretation should follow clear statutory text.	§ 52-5-1 is constitutional; it expresses legislative intent and does not impermissibly displace judicial interpretive tools.

Jaramillo v. Anaconda Co., 95 N.M. 728, 625 P.2d 1245 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (manhole cover case; employer provided device but coworkers failed to deploy it)
Martinez v. Zia Co., 100 N.M. 8, 664 P.2d 1021 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (rearview mirror on tractor held to be a safety device and failure to provide upheld)
Montoya v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 N.M. 268, 299 P.2d 84 (N.M. 1956) (definition: safety device as tangible instrumentality that lessens danger)
Apodaca v. Allison & Haney, 57 N.M. 315, 258 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1953) (gas indicator as safety device; legislative purpose of requiring employers to supply devices)
Baca v. Gutierrez, 77 N.M. 428, 423 P.2d 617 (N.M. 1967) (statute’s penalty purpose — to compel furnishing of safety devices)
Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977) (interpreting “provide” in OSHA context; cited and distinguished)
State ex rel. Weich Roofing, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 590 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (employer’s duty to ensure safety equipment is used; availability alone insufficient)