Benard McKinley v. Kim Butler
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 2001, 16-year-old Benard McKinley shot and killed Abdo Serna-Ibarra; McKinley was convicted of first‑degree murder and sentenced in 2004 to consecutive 50‑year terms (100 years total) with no possibility of early release under Illinois law.
- McKinley sought post‑conviction relief in Illinois (2008 onward) and raised an Illinois proportionate‑penalties challenge on direct appeal, but did not invoke the federal Eighth Amendment claim in state court.
- After exhausting state remedies without success, McKinley filed a federal habeas petition asserting his 100‑year sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment; the district court denied relief.
- On appeal, the majority focused on whether McKinley’s failure to present the federal Eighth Amendment claim in state court was excused by intervening Supreme Court authority (Miller v. Alabama) and whether Miller’s holdings apply to de facto life terms.
- The Seventh Circuit majority concluded the sentencing judge did not consider youth‑related mitigating factors required by Miller and remanded with instructions to stay federal proceedings pending McKinley’s opportunity to file a successive state post‑conviction petition invoking Miller.
- A dissent argued Miller did not create a new, retroactive rule applicable here, emphasized prior authority (including Croft), and warned the majority was effectively creating sentencing standards on habeas review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McKinley) | Defendant's Argument (Warden) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McKinley’s Eighth Amendment claim is exhausted in state court | McKinley contends his failure is excusable because Miller (decided after his state proceedings) announced a new requirement for juvenile sentencing | Warden: McKinley forfeited the federal claim by not raising it in state court; Miller should be confined to mandatory life statutes | Majority: Default excused for now; remand and stay to allow successive state filing under Miller |
| Applicability of Miller’s “children are different” principle to de facto life terms | Miller’s reasoning requires courts to consider youth even where sentence is a very long term of years amounting to de facto life | Warden: Miller should be limited to legislatively mandatory life‑without‑parole schemes | Majority: Miller’s logic extends to discretionary or de facto life terms; sentencing courts must consider age |
| Retroactivity / Excuse for procedural default | McKinley argues Miller was not reasonably available earlier and thus can excuse his procedural default under Reed v. Ross | Warden: Retroactivity is limited; federal retroactivity doctrine requires watershed procedural rules (rare) | Majority: Though federal retroactivity is narrow, Illinois law (People v. Davis) permits Miller retroactively on collateral review, so McKinley has state remedy and should be allowed to seek it first |
| Appropriate federal habeas remedy now | McKinley seeks habeas relief / resentencing because judge failed to consider youth | Warden opposes habeas relief and urges limiting Miller | Majority: Vacate district denial and remand with instruction to stay habeas proceedings pending McKinley’s filing of a successive state petition; no immediate habeas grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders; courts must account for youth)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (youth difference doctrine; death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment)
- Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (new constitutional rule may excuse procedural default if not reasonably available earlier)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (limits on retroactive application of new procedural rules on collateral review)
- Croft v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 2014) (held Miller inapplicable to discretionary life sentences in that case)
- McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2005) (example of nonretroactivity of significant sentencing decision)