Ben E. Jones v. State of Florida Parole Commission
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9127
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Ben E. Jones, convicted in Florida (sexual battery, crimes in 1978–79), sentenced to life; parole-eligible under the law in effect at time of offense.
- Florida law (pre-2001) required parole interviews at least every two years; 2001 and 2010 statutes expanded the maximum interval to five and then seven years for certain serious offenses, including sexual battery.
- Jones’s last parole interview occurred in 2012; his complaint (filed 2013) alleged his next interview was scheduled five years later and challenged the extended intervals as an Ex Post Facto violation.
- District court screened and dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent; Jones moved for reconsideration but did not tender an amended complaint or new factual allegations.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and focused on whether the statutory change (longer interval between reviews) creates a significant risk of increased punishment as barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether increasing maximum interval between parole interviews violates the Ex Post Facto Clause | Jones: longer intervals (5–7 years) retroactively increase punishment by making actual parole less likely | State: change is procedural, preserves substantive parole standards and discretion; does not create significant risk of longer confinement | Held: No facial violation; statutes not inherently creating significant risk of increased punishment |
| Whether the change is unconstitutional as applied to Jones | Jones: scheduling his next interview five years out injures his parole prospects | State: Jones’s interview was set at five years in 2012; he alleged no facts showing an earlier review would have changed his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) | Held: No as-applied violation—Jones failed to allege facts showing earlier review would have altered PPRD |
| Whether discovery or amendment should have been allowed before dismissal | Jones: district court should have granted leave to amend or allowed discovery to show actual effect | State: Jones did not propose amendments or facts; Supreme Court precedent requires showing a significant risk before discovery | Held: No leave required; dismissal proper because Jones failed to allege facts plausibly showing harm |
| Whether statistical evidence of fewer paroles supports Ex Post Facto claim | Jones: decline in paroles indicates the change has harmed parole chances | State: decline explained by abolition of parole for new crimes and shrinking eligible population; no causal link to interview intervals | Held: Statistics alone insufficient; no plausible causal allegation linking the interval change to increased confinement |
Key Cases Cited
- California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (statutory lengthening of review interval did not create sufficient risk of increased punishment)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (challenge to longer review intervals governed by whether change creates significant risk of increased confinement)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (Ex Post Facto Clause forbids laws that retroactively increase punishment)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards—courts accept factual allegations, not legal conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Jones v. Ray, 277 F.3d 944 (11th Cir.) (delay in review cannot state Ex Post Facto claim absent showing earlier review would have mattered)