Belue v. Leventhal
640 F.3d 567
| 4th Cir. | 2011Background
- Attorneys Irma Solares, Julianna McCabe, and Markham Leventhal pro hac vice admitted for defendants in a putative class action about alleged breaches of supplemental cancer insurance policies.
- Hearing in July 2009 raised concerns about Runyan settlement and class certification scheduling; district court made unfavorable remarks about the case and the lawyers.
- The district court revoked the attorneys' pro hac vice status after a July 27, 2009 revocation hearing, asserting bad faith filings and local-rule violations among other grounds.
- The revocation followed the attorneys’ recusal motion against the district judge, which the court characterized as inappropriate and a primary driver of the revocation.
- Plaintiffs settled the underlying action months later; attorneys moved to vacate the revocation order, which the district court denied; the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded.
- Court vacated the revocation order, remanding with directions that the matter be concluded forthwith, emphasizing due process requirements for pro hac vice revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pro hac vice revocation due process | Due process required notice and an opportunity to respond. | Court has discretion; minimal process suffices for revocation. | Revocation without adequate process violated due process |
| Recusal motion as basis for bias | Recusal motion showed bias against defendants and justified sanctions. | No sufficient bias; recusal not warranted. | Recusal motion not a sufficient basis for disqualification |
| Extrajudicial bias standard | Judge’s remarks and conduct reflected bias influencing rulings. | In-trial remarks do not generally constitute bias under Liteky. | Standard for bias requires extraordinary showing; not satisfied |
| Impact of district court remarks on revocation | Court’s hostile comments toward attorneys demonstrated prejudice. | Comments reflect vigor in case management, not recusal grounds. | Comments did not independently justify recusal or sanctioning of counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994) (extrajudicial bias must be from outside the case; opinions formed in the proceeding rarely justify recusal)
- In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.1987) (bias against attorney alone not sufficient; must show bias against party)
- Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.1980) (notice and opportunity to respond required for pro hac vice revocation)
- Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2005) (due process in sanctions includes notice and opportunity to be heard)
- Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.2001) (revocation of pro hac vice is a sanction; requires due process)
- Kirkland v. Nat'l Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir.1989) (some notice and opportunity to respond required in pro hac vice contexts)
- In re United States, 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir.2006) (recusal framework; emphasizes due process in sanctions)
- Sentis Group, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888 (8th Cir.2009) (recusal standards; disturbing remarks can be insufficient for disqualification)
- United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir.1995) (egregious conduct may warrant recusal; but typical heated rhetoric does not)
