Beltran-Rubio v. Holder
565 F. App'x 704
| 10th Cir. | 2014Background
- Beltran-Rubio, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1994 and later was convicted in Colorado of criminal impersonation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-113(1)(e).
- The Colorado conviction was a felony with a one-year minimum sentence; DHS charged him as removable for illegal entry and for committing a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).
- He applied for cancellation of removal; DHS moved to pretermit the application on the ground that his conviction was a CIMT, making him ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
- An IJ found him removable, granted DHS’s motion, denied cancellation, and ordered removal; the BIA affirmed, concluding § 18-5-113(1)(e) is categorically a CIMT because it requires deceit used to obtain a benefit, injure, or defraud.
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Colorado statute is categorically a CIMT and focused on the statute’s introductory element (knowingly assuming a false identity or capacity) plus the § 1(e) intent element.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-113(1)(e) is categorically a CIMT | Beltran-Rubio: statute criminalizes both morally turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous conduct (e.g., mere intent to benefit) so not categorically a CIMT | Government/BIA: statute’s introductory deceit element (knowingly assuming false identity/capacity) plus intent to benefit/injure/defraud supplies inherent fraud and moral turpitude | Court: statute is categorically a CIMT—deceit inherent in the statute renders conduct morally turpitudinous |
| Whether the presence of non-fraud intents (benefit or injury) defeats categorical CIMT status | Beltran-Rubio: inclusion of intents other than ‘defraud’ shows fraud is not required | Government: the knowing assumption of false identity supplies the fraudulent element for any of the listed intents; separate mental states remain (knowing vs. intentional) | Court: the introductory knowing-false-identity element implies the fraud necessary for CIMT even when §1(e) cites benefit or injury intents |
| Whether some convictions under the statute (e.g., licensed professional practicing while suspended; giving false name to police) show realistic probability of non-turpitudinous application | Beltran-Rubio: cites cases (Bauer, Borrego) to show statute can reach non-turpitudinous conduct | Government: cited facts in those cases involved deception and obtaining benefit or avoiding detection—consistent with fraud-based CIMT analysis | Court: examples do not show realistic probability of non-turpitudinous application; statute remains categorically a CIMT |
| Whether agency deference (Chevron) or BIA unpublished order controls analysis | Beltran-Rubio: (not primary) | Government: relied on BIA’s affirmance; suggested deference | Court: declines Chevron deference to unpublished BIA; reviews de novo but gives BIA limited persuasive weight where appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792 (10th Cir.) (de novo review of legal questions in immigration appeals)
- Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir.) (use of the categorical approach for CIMT analysis)
- Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir.) (definition of moral turpitude and limits on BIA deference regarding state-law interpretation)
- Lagunas-Salgado v. Holder, 584 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.) (selling false identification involves inherently deceptive conduct and is a CIMT)
- Alvarado v. People, 132 P.3d 1205 (Colo. 2006) (Colorado Supreme Court describing the statute’s two distinct mental-state elements)