Beltran De La Torre, Lisandro, 583 S.W.3d 613

Police found a small plastic bag of white powder (later lab-tested as .02 g cocaine) on the center console of a car; De La Torre was the driver and there were three other persons present. Officers field-tested the substance, arrested De La Torre and two passengers, and charged De La Torre with possession of <1 gram of cocaine.
State relied on evidence that De La Torre owned the car, sat in the driver’s seat with direct access to the console, and exhibited signs of narcotics use; it argued De La Torre could have jointly possessed the drug with the others in the vehicle.
The trial court’s written jury charge included the statutory possession definition ("actual care, custody, control, or management") and a non‑statutory instruction: "Two or more people can possess the same controlled substance at the same time." The court refused defense counsel’s oral request for a non‑statutory mere‑presence instruction ("Mere presence ... is not enough to constitute possession").
The jury convicted; De La Torre appealed. The court of appeals upheld both the joint‑possession instruction and the refusal to give a mere‑presence instruction.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review and held the joint‑possession instruction was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence (thus reversible), but the mere‑presence instruction was not required and was properly refused; the case was remanded to the court of appeals for a harm (Almanza) analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (De La Torre)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the trial court’s non‑statutory joint‑possession instruction violated Article 36.14 by commenting on the weight of the evidence	Instruction impermissibly added to statutory definition of possession and highlighted the State’s joint‑possession theory	Term "possession" has established legal meaning including joint possession; clarifying instruction prevents juror confusion about exclusive possession	Instruction was an improper comment on the evidence and unnecessary; reversal on this ground (remand for harm analysis)
Whether trial court erred in refusing De La Torre’s requested mere‑presence instruction after including the joint‑possession instruction	Jury should be told mere presence alone cannot establish possession to offset the joint‑possession instruction	Mere‑presence instruction would negate an element and improperly single out defense evidence; statutory definition already covers this point	Refusal was proper: mere‑presence instruction was unnecessary and would have impermissibly focused jury on defense theory

Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (non‑statutory instructions generally improper when unnecessary, covered by general charge, and highlight specific evidence)
Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (purpose of jury charge is to inform law neutrally; avoid judge comments on evidence)
Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (trial court must not express opinion on weight of evidence or single out facts)
Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (instruction that emphasizes particular evidence can impermissibly suggest judicial endorsement)
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (defining statutory elements via non‑statutory instruction can improperly guide jury factfinding)
Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (permissible to supply definitions for technical terms with established legal meaning)
Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (defendant not entitled to jury instruction on defensive issue that merely negates an element)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (requires harm analysis for jury‑charge error)
Green v. State, 476 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (limits on when non‑statutory technical definitions are permissible)