Bell v. State, 293 Ga. 683

On July 9, 2011, Walter E. Bell, driving a rented Mercedes, sped and weaved on GA-400, cut off Jenny McMillan-Gutierrez, causing her to lose control, crash into trees, and later die.
Bell fled the scene in his rental, switched to a different rental car, and was later indicted on multiple counts including first-degree vehicular homicide, reckless driving, hit-and-run, and tampering with evidence.
After a jury trial Bell was convicted of first-degree vehicular homicide, reckless driving, hit-and-run, and tampering with evidence; acquitted of felony murder and aggravated assault; sentenced to 20 years (15 for homicide, 5 consecutive for hit-and-run), with 12 to serve.
At trial the court excluded seatbelt and airbag-deployment evidence and Bell challenged OCGA § 40-8-76.1(d) (seatbelt statute) as unconstitutional; the trial court did not rule on that constitutional claim.
Bell appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the seatbelt statute and the Georgia hit-and-run statute (OCGA § 40-6-270(a)) were unconstitutional under the federal and Georgia self-incrimination protections, and raising sentencing/merger challenges.

Issue	Bell's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for convictions	Evidence proved at most aggressive driving, not reckless driving supporting first-degree vehicular homicide	Evidence sufficed to show reckless driving and all convictions	Affirmed: evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia
Constitutionality of OCGA § 40-8-76.1(d) (seatbelt statute)	Statute unconstitutional (raised pretrial)	Trial court excluded seatbelt evidence on other grounds; court never ruled on constitutionality below	Not reviewed on appeal — no ruling below, so appellate court did not reach the constitutional claim
Constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-270(a) (hit-and-run) under self-incrimination	Stopping and identifying at accident scene compels testimonial incrimination violating Fifth Amendment and Georgia Constitution	Statute is regulatory, applies to the public at large, and does not create substantial risk of self-incrimination	Rejected: hit-and-run statute does not violate federal or Georgia self-incrimination protections (California v. Byers controlling)
Merger and sentencing between tampering and hit-and-run counts	Indictment ambiguity and merger required felony tampering to be misdemeanor; sentencing on felony hit-and-run improper	Indictment read as a whole; lesser tampering merges into greater hit-and-run; sentencing on surviving felony is proper	Rejected: no confusion in indictment; sentencing on felony hit-and-run after merger was proper

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (hit-and-run reporting requirement does not violate Fifth Amendment)
Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247 (Georgia self-incrimination doctrine construed broadly)
Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367 (indictment must be read as a whole)
White v. State, 287 Ga. 713 (distinguishing misdemeanor tampering where defendant tampers in own case)
Reed v. State, 318 Ga. App. 412 (lesser offense merges into greater when same conduct establishes both)
Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (discussed merger tests; referenced as disavowed actual-evidence test)