Bell v. State
2017 Ark. 231
| Ark. | 2017Background
- In 1994 Albert D. Bell, a juvenile at the time, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms; this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in 1997 (State v. Bell).
- Bell filed multiple postconviction and resentencing petitions over the years (Rule 37.1, petition for recall, § 16-90-111), arguing among other things that his juvenile status and role as an accomplice made life sentences unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
- He relied on evolving Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence (Graham, Miller, Montgomery) and factual claims: purported mitigating youth evidence, jury deadlock leaving the judge to impose sentence, and that the principal (shooter) received a lesser punishment.
- The trial court denied Bell’s 2015–2016 § 16-90-111 petitions as either successive/unauthorized postconviction petitions or as not stating a basis for relief; this Court affirmed.
- The Court held Bell’s life sentences were within the statutory range for Class Y felonies (first-degree murder) and therefore not facially illegal; Graham did not apply because Bell was convicted of homicide, and Miller/Montgomery relief had already been considered in prior proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Bell's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bell’s life sentences were facially illegal under § 16-90-111 because he was a juvenile accomplice | Life terms for a juvenile accomplice are cruel/unusual; evolving standards forbid such sentences | Sentences were within statutory range for first-degree murder and not facially illegal | Denied — life sentences were statutorily permissible and not facially illegal |
| Whether Graham/Miller/Montgomery entitled Bell to resentencing or parole because he was an accomplice who did not kill | Graham (and related Eighth Amendment decisions) should bar life without parole for juveniles/accomplices | Bell was convicted of homicide; Arkansas law treats principals and accomplices the same; Graham not applicable | Denied — Graham inapplicable; prior rulings addressed these claims |
| Whether sentencing procedure (jury deadlock and judge imposing harshest sentence) rendered sentence invalid | Jury’s inability and judge’s imposition violated sentencing rights and Eighth Amendment | Procedural sentencing claims are trial errors that must be raised at trial; they do not render sentence facially illegal | Denied — claims are procedural/trial errors, not jurisdictional illegal-sentence defects |
| Whether collateral claims (insufficient evidence, disparity with shooter’s sentence) could be raised in § 16-90-111 petition | These constitutional/trial errors justify relief now | Such claims are successive/postconviction or properly raised at trial/under Rule 37, not via § 16-90-111 | Denied — claims are unauthorized successive relief or not the proper vehicle; court’s decision not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bell, 329 Ark. 422, 948 S.W.2d 557 (Ark. 1997) (affirming Bell’s convictions and life sentences)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders prohibited; youth must be considered as mitigating factor)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule applicable retroactively)
- Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (Ark. 1999) (sentence is facially illegal when it exceeds statutory maximum)
- Green v. State, 2016 Ark. 386, 502 S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2016) (clarifying facial illegality under Arkansas law)
- Lawshea v. State, 2009 Ark. 600, 357 S.W.3d 901 (Ark. 2009) (no distinction between principals and accomplices for criminal liability)