Bell v. State, 356 S.W.3d 528

Bell was tried in Fannin County for possessing Ecstasy (one gram or more, but less than four grams) with enhanced punishment allegations.
Evidence linked Bell to the Ecstasy: pills with a stamp resembling Ecstasy, residue of marihuana near Bell and on surrounding area, and a pill bottle found near Bell in a vehicle owned by Bell’s wife/Girlfriend.
Bell was a passenger in the vehicle; the pill bottle was within reach and visible; Bell was the proximate holder of the vehicle where contraband was found.
Police observed marihuana residue on Bell and contraband located in the same vicinity; Bell made movements suggesting furtive behavior during questioning.
The trial court ordered Bell shackled during guilt/innocence phase without individualized danger evidence, after initial progress of the trial, and the State conceded the restraint was not justified by Bell’s particularized risk.
The appellate court held: sufficient evidence linked Bell to the Ecstasy; shackling was error; but the shackling error was harmless under Chapman/Rule 44.2(a).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of linkage to Ecstasy	Bell argues the State failed to prove control/custody.	Bell contends proximity alone proves nothing.	Sufficient evidence linked Bell to the Ecstasy.
Whether trial shackling violated due process	Bell asserts routine shackling violates due process and presumption of innocence.	Court routinely restrains all in custody; no individualized reason shown.	Shackling without individualized justification is error.
Harmlessness of shackling error	Bell argues Deck mandates reversal absent proof of no harm.	State contends any harm was not demonstrated and may be harmless.	Under Chapman/Motilla Snowden framework, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Impact of Shackling on jury perception	Shackles could have affected jury’s view of Bell's guilt.	Record suggests steps were taken to prevent jury perception; no proof of perception.	No evidence the jury perceived the shackles; harm not shown.
Applicable harmless-error standard	Snowden limits factors to whether error contributed to verdict.	Harris factors may be applicable but not all; Snowden revised focus.	Chapman standard applied; error did not contribute to the judgment.

Deck v. Missouri, 544 S.W.2d 622 (2005) (limits on visible restraints; use of restraints must be justified by rare circumstances)
Gray v. State, 268 S.W.2d 941 (1924) (restraint of prisoner in trial; strong presumption against)
Cooks v. State, 844 S.W.2d 697 (1992) (restraining must be justified on the record; rare exceptions)
Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259 (1991) (record must reflect reasons for restraints; avoid prejudice to fairness)
Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (1989) (harmless-error factors guiding review (source, nature, emphasis, consequences))
Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (2002) (factors for harm analysis; weighs strength of guilt evidence)
Mason v. State, 322 S.W.3d 251 (2010) (modifies Harris for Rule 44.2(b) cases; factors not exclusive)
Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815 (2011) (eliminates two Harris factors; rest of factors remain for harm analysis)
Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327 (1981) (affirmative links test for possession of contraband)
Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402 (2005) (affirmative links and proximity considerations)
Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (2006) (requires proof of control/custody; mere presence insufficient)