Bell v. State
311 Ga. App. 289
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- Bell was convicted in 2005 of raping a 14-year-old in November 2003 at a Youth Detention Center in Pelham.
- On appeal, Bell challenged the admission of evidence of a prior 1996 acquitted transaction allegedly showing a similar modus operandi.
- Bell also challenged the denial of his motion for mistrial after prejudicial statements during voir dire.
- The State sought to use the 1996 acquittal to show course of conduct, identity, or intent; Bell claimed collateral estoppel barred this.
- The trial court allowed the 1996 acquittal evidence after a Williams v. State pre-trial analysis; Bell was ultimately convicted.
- The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the voir dire remarks tainted the jury pool and the mistrial should have been granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior acquitted transaction | Bell | Bell | Reversed; collateral estoppel barred use of the prior acquittal evidence |
| Effect of prejudicial voir dire remarks on mistrial | Bell | Bell | Reversed; mistrial required due to tainted jury pool |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (Ga. 1991) (pre-trial admissibility framework for prior acts)
- Banks v. State, 185 Ga. App. 851 (Ga. App. 1988) (collateral estoppel in prior acquittals)
- Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674 (Ga. 1985) (focus on disputed issues resolved in prior trial)
- Salcedo v. State, 258 Ga. 870 (Ga. 1989) (collateral estoppel—whether issues were resolved in defendant's favor)
- Cartwright v. State, 242 Ga. App. 825 (Ga. App. 2000) (prior acts admissible when identity not at issue)
- Riley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 667 (Ga. App. 1987) (collateral estoppel limits relitigation of intent)
- Lingerfelt v. State, 147 Ga. App. 371 (Ga. App. 1978) (prejudice from improper statements requires careful handling)
- White v. State, 268 Ga. 28 (Ga. 1997) (standard for mistrial when prejudicial conduct occurs)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (Supreme Court 1982) (due process and prejudicial impact on juror impartiality)
