Bell v. PNC Bank, National Ass'n
800 F.3d 360
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Mariseli Bell, a former PNC senior banker, sued PNC under the FLSA and Illinois wage laws alleging widespread unpaid overtime and an unofficial company practice discouraging reporting of overtime; she sought certification of a class of non-exempt employees at 27 Illinois branches.
- Bell supported her claim with her affidavit, an affidavit from her (now-deceased) branch manager Letticia Flores, reports from PNC’s employee-relations investigations showing multiple complaints of unpaid overtime across branches, and other affidavits suggesting managers discouraged recording overtime.
- PNC pointed to written policies requiring overtime pay, asserted it paid overtime at branches during the class period, and produced investigation reports showing many complaints were investigated and in many instances employees were later paid or managers disciplined.
- The district court certified a class for employees at 26 branches (narrowing Bell’s initial list) concluding the central common question—whether PNC had an unofficial policy or practice requiring off-the-clock work—was capable of classwide resolution and that common issues predominated.
- On appeal PNC argued the plaintiff was required to prove (not merely allege) an unwritten policy at certification and that individualized liability questions made class treatment inappropriate; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a class may be certified based on an alleged unofficial, companywide practice of discouraging overtime reporting | Bell: Common question exists whether PNC maintained an unofficial policy/practice requiring off‑the‑clock overtime; evidence (affidavits, investigation reports) permits classwide resolution | PNC: Plaintiff must actually prove the unwritten policy at certification (not merely allege) because absence of such a policy means individual proofs dominate | Court: Plaintiff need not prove merits at certification; she must show a common question capable of classwide proof. Evidence supported commonality and predominance, so certification proper |
| Whether individualized liability issues defeat Rule 23(b)(3) predominance because damages/hours vary by employee | Bell: Predominance is satisfied by a common liability question; individualized damages can be handled later (second-phase hearings) | PNC: Even if a common policy is rejected, individual issues (hours worked, manager knowledge) would swamp the case | Court: Individualized damages do not defeat predominance; a classwide liability determination is efficient and, if liability fails, the class fails in unison; individualized relief can follow in later proceedings |
| Whether the district court improperly resolved merits at the certification stage | Bell: Certification is appropriate where common questions predominate; limited merits inquiry is permitted to the extent it bears on Rule 23 | PNC: District court improperly weighed merits and relied on disputed evidence without requiring proof | Court: District court properly conducted a limited, rigorous inquiry without deciding the merits; it may consider disputed facts by affidavits at certification |
| Whether cured or post-investigation payments negate class claims or predominance | Bell: Post-hoc payments and discipline do not negate existence of an underlying practice or relevance to willfulness and damages | PNC: Payments and corrective actions show no unlawful common practice and reduce commonality | Court: Cures and payments do not eliminate common liability questions (e.g., willfulness, extent of harm); they affect damages but do not preclude certification |
Key Cases Cited
- Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.) (trial court may receive evidence, even by affidavit, to resolve factual disputes at class-certification stage)
- Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) (plaintiffs bear preponderance burden to show compliance with Rule 23; common-question proof must be capable of classwide proof)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
- Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013) (Rule 23(b)(3) requires that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions be decided in plaintiffs’ favor at certification)
- Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir.) (recognizing an unofficial companywide overtime-denial theory can supply the common answer driving classwide resolution)
- Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (class certification may be appropriate despite varying individual results so long as common issues and methodology predominate)
- Mejdrech v. Met‑Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing situations where plaintiffs presented a coherent, common theory capable of proof from those lacking any identified common issue)