Bell v. McDonald, 432 S.W.3d 18

Carl F. McDonald died Nov. 30, 2011; Lana Eagle McDonald prosecuted probate of his will (dated Feb. 2, 2010) which left nothing to Carmella Bell and awarded all property to McDonald’s sister.
Bell, presumed legitimate as the decedent’s sister’s child? (not necessary) filed notices to contest the will in Feb–Mar 2012 and later petitioned to be a pretermitted child entitled to receive distribution.
In May 2012 Bell filed a Petition of Pre-termitted Child to Receive Distribution and related pleadings asserting she was the decedent’s sole heir; she claimed 180-day deadline under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d).
Lana McDonald moved to dismiss on June 4, 2012 arguing Bell was not a child and failed to satisfy § 28-9-209(d) within 180 days, citing Bell’s mother Regina Wingard’s paternity action as context.
Bell argued the 180-day period applied only to filing a claim, not to satisfying the six conditions; the circuit court rejected this interpretation and dismissed Bell’s petition with prejudice on March 28, 2013.
Bell appealed; the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding the 180-day window requires both filing and completion of one condition within that period; constitutional challenges were rejected.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 28-9-209(d) requires both timely filing and a condition be satisfied	Bell argued only a timely filing is needed, not completion of a condition within 180 days.	McDonald contended both filing and satisfaction of a listed condition must occur within 180 days.	Both filing and a condition must occur within 180 days.
Whether Bell's petition constitutes an action commenced or claim asserted within 180 days	Bell asserted her petition was a timely claim against the estate.	McDonald contended the petition did not amount to an action commenced or claim asserted within the period.	Not necessary to resolve for this case; dispositive issue is the dual timing requirement.
Whether the 180-day rule violates due process or equal protection	Bell claimed the interpretation imposes unconstitutional burdens on illegitimate heirs.	McDonald argued the statute withstands equal-protection and due-process scrutiny.	Constitutional challenges rejected; statute upheld.

Burns v. Estate of Cole, 364 Ark. 280 (2005) (interprets 180-day limit requiring both filing and condition satisfaction)
Boatman v. Dawkins, 294 Ark. 421 (1988) (upholds constitutionality of § 28-9-209 against equal-protection concerns)
In re Estate of Keathley, 367 Ark. 568 (2006) (case addressing timing of claims under § 28-9-209(d))
In re Estate of F.C., 321 Ark. 191 (1995) (proceedings involving illegitimacy and inheritance timing)
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (Supreme Court: state interests in preventing spurious claims against estates)
McMillan v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 2012 Ark. 166 (2012) (statutory interpretation de novo; plain language governs)