Bell v. City of Boise
834 F. Supp. 2d 1103
D. Idaho2011Background
- Plaintiffs are homeless individuals in Boise who allege enforcement of Boise City Codes 9-10-02 (Camping) and 6-01-05(A) (Sleeping) targets homelessness.
- Defendants include the City of Boise, Boise Police Department, and Chief of Police; plaintiffs allege aggressive, selective enforcement against the homeless.
- City provides daytime safe harbor in parks and nighttime shelter options; a Special Order (effective Jan 1, 2010) directs officers not to enforce at night when shelter space is unavailable.
- Camping is defined as using public property as dwelling or sleeping overnight; sleeping is prohibited without owner permission.
- Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory/injunctive relief; district court granted summary judgment for defendants, dismissing the amended complaint.
- Court concludes the Special Order and a new camping definition moot most claims and grants summary judgment for the city.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction for retrospective relief under Rooker-Feldman | Plaintiffs seek damages based on state court judgments. | Rooker-Feldman bars federal review of state-court judgments. | Rooker-Feldman bars retrospective relief. |
| Mootness of prospective relief due to Special Order | Enforcement continues when shelters are full. | Special Order ensures no enforcement when shelter is unavailable. | Prospective relief largely moot; Special Order sufficient. |
| Eighth Amendment violation from enforcement against homeless | Enforcement punishes involuntary status of homelessness. | Enforcement targets conduct; shelters available during the day. | Eighth Amendment claim fails; not proven ongoing unconstitutional enforcement. |
| Vagueness of Camping Ordinance | Camping ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as applied. | Definitions provide adequate notice; distinctions drawn between camping and mere presence. | Camping Ordinance not unconstitutionally vague. |
| Right to travel under the due process clause | Enforcement burdens travel by homeless. | Restrictions do not meaningfully deter travel of the homeless. | Right to travel claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (U.S. 1962) (punishing status vs. conduct; Eighth Amendment limit on criminalizing status)
- Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1968) (punishment for public drunkenness not for status; conduct-based)
- Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (sitting/lying/sleeping in public unconstitutional as applied to homeless; later vacated)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (not vague for failure to require precise conduct; credibility requirement)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (U.S. 1923) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state-court judgments)
- Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (intertwined issues; Rooker-Feldman applicability)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (Rooker-Feldman scope clarified)
- Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (prospective relief vs. retrospective relief distinction)