908 F.3d 829
1st Cir.2018Background
- Jason Begin, a psychiatric patient previously committed, was told he would be recommitted at a Riverview outpatient office; police officer Laura Drouin was called to be present and transport him.
- As Drouin approached the waiting area (about 20 feet away), Begin stood, pulled a folding knife from his pocket, announced "I should have done this moons ago," and began cutting his own arm while remaining stationary.
- Drouin drew her firearm about one second after Begin produced the knife, gave no express warning, and fired three shots, wounding Begin twice in the chest and once in the shoulder.
- District court found, for summary-judgment purposes, that a jury could find Begin posed no immediate threat to others and that Riverview staff were in close proximity but not between Drouin and Begin.
- Begin sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreasonable seizure (excessive force); Drouin asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment; the magistrate judge denied the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether interlocutory review can revisit district court factual determinations on summary judgment | Begin: district court correctly viewed facts in his favor; appeal should be dismissed to extent it challenges factual findings | Drouin: challenges district court's factual view of proximity/threat and contends entitlement to interlocutory review of those facts | Court: Dismissed appeal insofar as it seeks to relitigate factual findings; appellate review must accept district court's assumed facts |
| Whether Drouin violated Fourth Amendment by using deadly force absent immediate threat | Begin: shooting was unreasonable because he was self-harming, stationary, and posed no threat to others | Drouin: reasonably believed Begin posed imminent threat to staff and herself given knife and Begin's size/history | Court: On the assumed facts, a jury could find no immediate threat; dispute of fact precludes summary judgment on liability |
| Whether Drouin is entitled to qualified immunity (clearly established law) | Begin: law (e.g., McKenney) clearly established that shooting a suicidal, armed person who poses no immediate threat is unlawful | Drouin: an objectively reasonable officer would have believed force was lawful under circumstances | Held: Given the assumed facts, precedent (including McKenney) would have put a reasonable officer on notice that shooting was unlawful; denial of qualified immunity affirmed |
| Whether lack of warnings defeats immunity/summar y judgment | Begin: no warning was given and, where feasible, warning is required before deadly force | Drouin: split-second judgment made warnings infeasible | Court: Feasibility of warning is a factual question for jury; denial of summary judgment appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (interlocutory appeal allowed for qualified immunity denials)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (appellate courts must accept district court's assumed facts on interlocutory review)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (use-of-force reasonableness standard; split-second judgments)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force permissible only if suspect poses immediate threat; warnings when feasible)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or knowing violators)
- McKenney v. Mangino, 873 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.) (clearly established law that shooting a suicidal, armed, nonthreatening person at distance can be unconstitutional)