Beers v. Attorney Gen. United States
927 F.3d 150
3rd Cir.2019Background
- In December 2005 Beers was involuntarily committed after a suicide attempt involving a firearm; Pennsylvania courts found him a danger to himself and extended commitment.
- Beers has had no mental-health treatment since 2006; a 2013 physician opined he could safely handle firearms.
- After discharge Beers was denied a firearm purchase based on his involuntary commitment and sued, alleging 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
- The district court dismissed under the Third Circuit two-step framework (from Marzzarella/Binderup), finding Beers could not distinguish himself from the historically barred class and that rehabilitation/time are irrelevant at step one.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that § 922(g)(4) covers persons involuntarily committed as dangerous to self/others and that evidence of rehabilitation or passage of time cannot, at step one, restore Second Amendment protection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(4) burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment as applied to Beers | Beers: although previously committed, he has been rehabilitated and time/reformation distinguish him from the historically barred class | Government: Beers was involuntarily committed as dangerous to self/others and thus falls within the historically barred class; rehabilitation/time are irrelevant at step one | Held: Beers cannot distinguish himself; § 922(g)(4) does not burden Second Amendment conduct as applied to him; affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right but allows longstanding prohibitions)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (two-step framework: whether conduct falls within Second Amendment scope, then heightened scrutiny)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (clarifies step one: challenger must show he is not a member of historically barred class; rehabilitation/time irrelevant)
- United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (as-applied felon-dispossession analysis and historical inquiry)
- United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002) (executive branch better equipped than courts to make individualized restoration determinations)
- Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (contrasting en banc view that § 922(g)(4) may burden Second Amendment rights)