Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53540
| D.D.C. | 2011Background
- Plaintiffs sue Iran and MOIS under the FSIA state-sponsored terrorism exception (§ 1605A) for deaths from a 2003 Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem.
- Court previously held Iran and MOIS liable for Alan Beer's death under state-sponsored terrorism theories.
- In Beer I, compensatory damages were awarded under state-law theories; punitive damages were denied under the prior § 1605(a)(7) framework.
- Beer II held punitive damages were available under § 1605A, but instructed plaintiffs to propose an appropriate punitive-damages framework.
- Court adopts the Flatow Method (annual terrorist funding times a multiplier) for calculating punitive damages under § 1605A, despite post-Flatow and post-Cicippio developments.
- Court adopts a mid-range annual funding figure of $100 million and a multiplier of 3, awarding $300 million in punitive damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether due process constraints limit FSIA punitive damages | Pls rely on Flatow framework; argue high punitive awards deter Iran. | Iran argues due process limits apply, as in Gore/Philip Morris; foreign states deserve protections. | Due process limits do not apply to FSIA punitive damages against foreign states. |
| Whether Exxon-like maritime due process principles apply to FSIA cases | Flatow method remains valid despite Exxon guidance; terrorism context unique. | Exxon requires reevaluation of punitive framework in light of maritime law. | Exxon does not alter the Flatow Method for FSIA terrorism cases. |
| Whether Congress reaffirmed the Flatow Method with § 1605A | NDAA § 1083 implicitly approved reinstitution of the Flatow approach. | Congress could have changed the method but did not; statutory language remains ambiguous. | Congress implicitly approved the Flatow Method by reenacting punitive framework under § 1605A. |
| Whether the Flatow Method is appropriate given terrorism's unique harms | Deterrence and punishment for state-sponsored terrorism justify higher awards. | Excessive awards threaten fairness and could undermine deterrence policy. | Flatow Method remains appropriate due to terrorism's unique harms and public policy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Department of Justice v. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (Flatow framework for punitive-damages calculation in FSIA cases)
- In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (discusses Flatow method and NDAA implications)
- Gore v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. 559 (U.S. 1996) (reconnaissance of due-process guideposts for punitive damages)
- Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (U.S. 2008) (limits on maritime punitive-damages framework; impact on FSIA discussed but limited)
- Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (foreign states not protected by Fifth Amendment due process)
- Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (held § 1605(a)(7) did not create individual-liability for foreign states)
- Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2009) (post-NDAA cases adopting Flatow method; confirms deterrence rationale)
- Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (adopts Flatow methodology in post-NDAA context)