Bedrick v. Bedrick
17 A.3d 17
| Conn. | 2011Background
- dissolution of marriage action; Bruce Bedrick seeks to enforce a postnuptial agreement (Dec. 10, 1977, with five handwritten addenda, last on May 18, 1989); terms: no alimony, plaintiff to receive cash to be reviewed, $75,000 addendum; plaintiff waives interest in car wash business and is not liable for defendant's loans.
- trial court found the agreement was not fair and equitable, refused enforcement; noted lack of consideration, lack of independent counsel, and changed financial circumstances; value of combined assets ~$927,123; child born in 1991; parties aged 57 at trial; years of business operations by plaintiff and maintenance of financial records.
- trial court treated postnuptial with equity standards rather than pure contract law; appellate history includes transfer to this court; decision relies on postnuptial scrutiny principles established in this opinion.
- court sets forth that postnuptial agreements are valid but require fair and equitable execution and not unconscionable at dissolution; in this case, enforcement would be unconscionable given changed circumstances and the 1989 terms.
- the central legal issue is whether the postnuptial agreement may be enforced under CT law given its execution context and dissolution-time unconscionability; court affirms trial court’s denial of enforcement.
- the parties are now fifty-seven; the agreement’s terms were unconscionable at dissolution; this opinion overrules the trial court only insofar as it applies the postnuptial standards; final judgment affirms unenforceability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether postnuptial agreements are enforceable under Connecticut law. | Bedrick argues contract-law principles apply. | Bedrick contends postnuptial scrutiny applies. | Enforceable only if fair and equitable at execution and not unconscionable at dissolution; in this case, unconscionable at dissolution. |
| What standard governs enforcement of postnuptial agreements (contract principles vs equity). | Bedrick maintains ordinary contract principles should apply. | Bedrick argues equity considerations used by trial court apply. | Postnuptial agreements require special scrutiny and must comply with contract principles, fair and equitable at execution, not unconscionable at dissolution. |
| Whether lack of consideration invalidates the postnuptial agreement. | Bedrick asserts consideration exists in exchange of rights and forbearances. | Bedrick argues lack of formal consideration could render unenforceable. | Sufficient consideration not required to resolve issue; the agreement remains unenforceable due to unconscionability at dissolution. |
| Whether disclosure and lack of independent counsel affected enforceability. | Plaintiff did not receive sworn financial affidavit or independent counsel. | Disclosure and counseling may be relevant to execution fairness. | Disclosure and opportunity to consult are relevant to execution fairness, but the outcome rests on dissolution unconscionability. |
| Whether the trial court properly applied standards to determine unconscionability. | Court should apply standard of fairness at execution and unconscionability at dissolution. | Court should adhere to contract principles with equity as context. | Trial court correctly concluded enforcement would work injustice; postnuptial agreement unenforceable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153 (2010) (establishes unconscionability as a matter of law on a case-by-case basis; compares postnuptial enforceability to injustice risk)
- McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482 (1980) (prenuptial enforceability requires fair conditions; contract principles apply; significant change may justify non-enforcement)
- McCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410 (1951) (public policy and family integrity considerations in dissolution contexts)
- Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 457 Mass. 283 (2010) (postnuptial scrutiny; confidentiality/relationship considerations; prudent disclosure)
- Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212 (1991) (public policy favoring private resolution of financial affairs in dissolution contexts)
- Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80 (1992) (unconscionability as a matter of law; case-by-case evaluation of circumstances)