Bedin v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2021 IL App (1st) 190723

Dolores Bedin was hospitalized at Northwestern in Sept. 2010; hospital recommended discharge which Janet (her daughter, with power of attorney) opposed.
Northwestern told Janet it might seek a court-appointed guardian and on Oct. 22, 2010 filed petitions for temporary/permanent guardianship and to invalidate/suspend Janet’s power of attorney.
A guardian ad litem reported Dolores was oriented but did not need to be in the hospital; parties entered an agreed order providing for discharge on Nov. 12, 2010; the guardianship proceedings continued into December 2010.
Plaintiffs sued on Nov. 13, 2012 alleging abuse of process and IIED; most claims were dismissed as time-barred on first appeal, but Janet’s IIED claim was remanded for factual development about threats made on or after Nov. 12, 2010.
On remand Janet amended her IIED complaint with allegations of threatening statements by hospital staff before and during the guardianship proceedings; Northwestern moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619, arguing the absolute litigation privilege barred the IIED claim.
The trial court granted dismissal on the privilege ground; the appellate court affirmed, holding the statements were pertinent to the guardianship and therefore privileged.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the absolute litigation privilege bars Janet’s IIED claim	Bedin: Many alleged statements were not made "prior to and in contemplation" of the guardianship and some allegations fall outside litigation-related conduct	Northwestern: Statements were made in contemplation of and during the guardianship litigation and thus are absolutely privileged	The privilege applied: statements were sufficiently related/pertinent to the guardianship, so IIED claim barred
Whether statute-of-limitations defeats the IIED claim	Bedin: Alleged continuing threats through Dec. 2, 2010 made claim timely	Northwestern: Allegations occurred earlier and claim is time-barred	Court: Northwestern forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense by not raising it below; court did not decide the merits of that defense
Whether Bedin had to be a party or hospital employees part of a "control group" for the privilege to apply	Bedin: She wasn’t a party to the guardianship and employer employees weren’t shown to be in a control group, so privilege shouldn’t bar recovery	Northwestern: Privilege protects statements made by participants/agents in contemplation of or during litigation; control-group rule is an attorney-client concept	Court: No authority requires the target to be a party; the control-group rule for attorney-client privilege is inapplicable — privilege still applies

Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148 (accept well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences on a section 2-619 motion)
Medow v. Flavin, 336 Ill. App. 3d 20 (2002) (litigation privilege requires communications to be relevant, pertinent, or bear some relation to the controversy)
Defend v. Lascelles, 149 Ill. App. 3d 630 (1986) (definition of pertinency quoted for privilege scope)
Malevitis v. Friedman, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1129 (2001) (privilege applies even if statement is not confined to specific issues in litigation)
Fox v. Heimann, 375 Ill. App. 3d 35 (2007) (statute-of-limitations is an affirmative defense forfeited if not raised in trial court)
Claxton v. Thackston, 201 Ill. App. 3d 232 (1990) (describes the corporate "control group" rule for attorney-client privilege)
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., 138 Ill. App. 3d 276 (1985) (further articulation of the control-group test)