Becky, Ltd. v. the City of Cedar Park, Matt Powell, Stephen Thomas, Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy, 03-15-00259-CV

Background

Becky, Ltd. owns a landlocked vacant tract in Cedar Park and challenges a Unified Development Agreement (UDA) between the City and Milestone that dedicates right‑of‑way and obligates Milestone to build Phase 1 of Old Mill Road but not Phase 2 to Becky's parcel.
City Council authorized the UDA in September 2013; Becky sued city and council members (official capacities) under the UDJA seeking declarations that the Agreement violated ordinances and was ultra vires.
At the time the city filed a plea to the jurisdiction Becky had not filed a completed plat; after the plea Becky submitted materials that the Planning & Zoning Commission statutorily disapproved to allow revisions.
City moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, lack of standing, ripeness, and mootness; trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction.
Appellees contend the Council’s decision to enter the UDA was discretionary under the City Code (uses "may"), so ultra vires exception and UDJA waiver do not apply; Becky is not a party to the Agreement and alleged injuries are speculative.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the ultra vires exception waive governmental immunity for Council’s approval of the UDA?	Becky: Council exceeded authority by approving terms that deviate from subdivision requirements (effectively a variance).	City: Contracting and deciding what roadwork to require are discretionary; Code uses "may" for roadway construction so no ministerial duty was breached.	Trial court lacked jurisdiction; ultra vires exception not implicated because action was discretionary.
Does the UDJA waive the city's immunity for a declaratory action about ordinance application?	Becky: Seeking declaratory relief about rights under city ordinances waives immunity.	City: Sefzik controls—UDJA does not waive sovereign immunity when plaintiff only seeks interpretation or declarations under a statute/ordinance rather than invalidating it.	UDJA does not waive immunity for mere interpretation; dismissal appropriate.
Does Becky have standing to challenge an agreement to which it is not a party?	Becky: Nearby owner harmed by lack of road to its parcel and potential diminution in value.	City: Only those with a direct legal right affected by the Agreement can sue; alleged economic harm is speculative and not a breach of Becky's legal rights.	Becky lacks standing—no concrete, particularized legal right breached by the Agreement.
Are Becky's claims ripe (and justiciable) before final action on Becky's plat application?	Becky: Submitted development materials after plea; seeks declaration to prevent future obligations.	City: No final administrative decision; obligation to build or pay depends on facts that may never materialize—claims are speculative and premature.	Claims not ripe; court lacks jurisdiction because harm is contingent on future events.

Key Cases Cited

Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to jurisdiction may implicate merits and the court may consider jurisdictional evidence)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires exception limited to acts without legal authority or failure to perform purely ministerial duties)
Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) (UDJA does not waive sovereign immunity when plaintiff seeks only interpretation/declaration under a statute or ordinance)
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2015) (legislature's use of "shall" can create mandatory duties subject to ultra vires enforcement; distinguishes mandatory duties from discretionary ones)
Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (third parties lacking property interest in subject parcels lack standing to challenge development agreements)