Beberman v. United States
131 Fed. Cl. 522
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Julie Beberman, a non‑tenured Foreign Service employee, was reassigned from Embassy Malabo after her limited appointment expired on March 27, 2016; she alleges she lost overseas pay/benefits and local Washington benefits upon return.
- Beberman sued the State Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands in May 2014 alleging discrimination (Title VII/ADEA claims); that case remained pending and included motions related to her removal from post and denial of tenure.
- After the district court denied a TRO and the Third Circuit denied emergency relief, Beberman filed an Equal Pay Act claim in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) in August 2016 and again in 2017, alleging gender‑based pay/benefit discrimination tied to the same factual sequence (denial of tenure, separation orders, differential treatment of a male colleague).
- The CFC previously dismissed a 2016 CFC filing by Beberman under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 because an earlier district‑court suit raised the same operative facts; the 2014 D.V.I. case remains pending through the date of this opinion.
- The Court of Federal Claims reconsidered the 2017 Equal Pay Act complaint and concluded § 1500 again barred jurisdiction because the district court action was earlier filed and the claims arise from substantially the same operative facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1500 bars the CFC's jurisdiction because of an earlier pending suit in another court | Beberman contends her Equal Pay Act claim is distinct and may proceed in CFC despite the ongoing D.V.I. suit | The government argues § 1500 applies because Beberman's D.V.I. suit was filed earlier and remains pending | Held: § 1500 applies; an earlier pending D.V.I. suit exists, so CFC lacks jurisdiction |
| Whether the district‑court and CFC claims arise from the same operative facts | Beberman argues the CFC claim alleges a different legal theory (Equal Pay Act) and thus is not barred | The government argues both suits rely on the same operative facts (tenure denial, separation orders, loss of benefits, comparison to a male colleague) | Held: Both suits rest on substantially the same operative facts; legal theory differences do not avoid § 1500 bar |
| Whether repackaging allegations into different theories avoids § 1500 | Beberman asserts repackaging into an Equal Pay Act claim is permissible | Government contends repackaging is insufficient to evade § 1500 | Held: Repackaging into different legal theories is insufficient; § 1500 jurisdictional bar still applies |
| Remedy for lack of jurisdiction under § 1500 | Beberman seeks reinstatement, back pay, liquidated damages, and injunctive relief in CFC | Government seeks dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | Held: Court dismissed the CFC complaint without prejudice for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction; clerk to enter judgment and return noncompliant filings |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 ( § 1500 bars CFC jurisdiction when an earlier suit in another court is pending)
- Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (two‑part test for § 1500: earlier suit pending and claims arise "for or in respect to" same claim)
- Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (legal theory differences do not avoid § 1500 if operative facts are the same)
- Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (distinguish operative facts from background facts for § 1500 analysis)
- Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (legal theory is irrelevant to whether claims are the same for § 1500 purposes)