Beatrice Vasquez & Darryl De La Cruz v. Old Austin Road Land Trust, Joseph Anthony Pizzini Individually and as Trustee of Old Austin Road Land Trust, & John Price
04-16-00025-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 26, 2017Background
- De La Cruz owned a Selma, Texas lot; Vasquez (his aunt) lived in a house on the lot. De La Cruz conveyed the property to Ralph Carpenter in 1999.
- Vasquez and De La Cruz sued Carpenter under the DTPA; a jury found Carpenter liable and awarded Vasquez damages.
- Carpenter later conveyed the property (2013) to Old Austin Road Land Trust (appellees); appellants then sued Carpenter and the appellees asserting DTPA, fraudulent-transfer (TUFTA), trespass-to-try-title, civil conspiracy, IIED, and other claims.
- The appellees moved for traditional summary judgment on affirmative defenses (bona fide purchaser, collateral estoppel) and no-evidence summary judgment on appellants’ claims; the trial court granted summary judgment and severed the matter.
- On appeal, the court reversed parts of the trial court’s judgment (notably as to claims against Carpenter and certain defenses) and affirmed other parts (no-evidence dismissal of several tort and DTPA claims against the appellees), then remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grant of summary judgment as to Carpenter | Appellants argued claims against Carpenter were adjudicated despite Carpenter not moving for summary judgment | Appellees treated Carpenter as a resolved defendant in the summary judgment order | Reversed — court cannot grant summary judgment for a party who did not move for it; claims vs. Carpenter remain pending |
| Bona fide purchaser defense (title/TUFTA) | Appellants argued appellees had constructive notice because Vasquez was in sole, visible possession | Appellees argued they purchased in good faith for value without notice | Reversed — factual dispute exists whether appellees had constructive notice; summary judgment on this defense improper |
| Collateral estoppel (reliance on prior DTPA judgment) | Appellants said prior DTPA judgment against Carpenter does not preclude new claims; title issues were not fully litigated earlier | Appellees argued prior DTPA litigation resolved title or barred relitigation | Reversed — prior action did not fully and fairly litigate facts essential to title; collateral estoppel inapplicable |
| No-evidence DTPA claim (consumer status) | Appellants claimed DTPA applies to appellees’ conduct | Appellees argued appellants were not "consumers" re: the transaction (did not seek/acquire goods/services) | Affirmed — appellants not consumers for the conveyance transaction; DTPA claim fails |
| No-evidence civil conspiracy (DTPA-based) | Appellants asserted appellees conspired to acquire property knowing it would deceive them | Appellees said no evidence they knew the acquisition would deceive appellants or participated in a deceptive course of conduct | Affirmed — no evidence appellees knew the acquisition had a tendency to deceive; summary judgment proper |
| No-evidence IIED | Appellants claimed appellees’ conduct (e.g., terminating utilities) was extreme/outrageous and caused severe distress | Appellees argued conduct was not extreme/outrageous and any distress was not severe | Affirmed — conduct not legally extreme/outrageous as a matter for summary judgment; claim dismissed |
| No-evidence trespass-to-try-title / fraudulent-transfer remedies | Appellants argued prior judgment and post-judgment acts supported superior title and avoidance of transfer | Appellees argued appellants lacked superior title and TUFTA avoidance is barred by bona fide purchaser | Mixed — no-evidence dismissal of trespass claim reversed (appellants presented evidence defeating no-evidence challenge); TUFTA avoidance tied to bona fide purchaser defense also reversed due to factual dispute |
| Evidentiary rulings (Price affidavit; utility bills) | Appellants sought to strike Price’s affidavit and admit utility-bill exhibit | Appellees objected to affidavit inconsistencies and offered hearsay objection to bills | Affidavit admission affirmed (no abuse); exclusion of utility-bill exhibit, even if error, was not reversible harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015) (no-evidence summary judgment standard)
- Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001) (bona fide purchaser elements and constructive notice via visible, exclusive possession)
- Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2016) (TUFTA avoidance not effective against good-faith transferees for value)
- Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994) (elements for collateral estoppel)
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (elements and high threshold for IIED; question often one of law)
- Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (definition of extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED)
