Beasley, Willie Donnell
WR-11,721-19
| Tex. App. | Aug 10, 2015Background
- Applicant Willie Donnell Beasley was convicted by a Henderson County jury of aggravated robbery (cause A‑9192‑J) and sentenced by judge to 40 years as an habitual offender after pleading not true to one enhancement and true to a second; conviction affirmed on appeal and PDR refused (affirmed by 12th Court of Appeals; PDR refused July 26, 2000).
- Applicant filed prior art. 11.07 habeas in 2000 (denied without written order); this is a subsequent 2015 amended art. 11.07 application claiming newly‑available factual/legal bases and invoking actual‑innocence gateway.
- Central factual contention: two enhancement paragraphs (burglary A‑4667 and robbery A‑6883) were not final at the time of the primary offense and thus improperly used to enhance punishment to habitual range; county clerk letter shows “no mandate” in those prior causes.
- Additional constitutional claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel (failure to investigate priors and potential alibi witnesses; failure to move to dismiss enhancements; failure to call/produce alibi witnesses), juror misconduct/unapproved communication (investigator Kay Langford allegedly spoke with prospective juror Paula Hamlet), and conflict of interest (trial counsel Teresa Drum allegedly had close ties to the prosecutor and was concurrently a city prosecutor).
- Relief requested: vacatur, remand for acquittal or new trial / new punishment hearing, appointment of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing on the habeas claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Beasley) | Defendant's Argument (State / Posture) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Improper enhancement paragraphs / illegal sentence | Two prior convictions used for enhancement were not final at time of primary offense; therefore enhancement to habitual range was illegal and sentence is outside lawful range | State previously prevailed on direct appeal (conviction affirmed); in earlier proceedings courts treated prior evidence as circumstantially sufficient to prove finality | Application alleges illegal sentence; prior art.11.07 denied previously without written order; no final habeas decision on these amended claims included in record provided |
| 2) Actual innocence gateway to overcome subsequent‑writ bar | New factual/legal evidence (non‑final priors, witness affidavits, identification problems) satisfy Schlup preponderance gateway so constitutional claims may be considered | State maintains regular procedural bars and prior adjudications; direct appeal and PDR were resolved adverse to Beasley | Applicant asserts gateway; no court ruling on gateway in this filing excerpt |
| 3) Ineffective assistance — penalty phase (failure to investigate priors) | Counsel failed to investigate and object to non‑final priors; had counsel acted, state would not have proved finality and punishment would have been lower | State (or record) previously allowed judge to find enhancements true; trial judge relied on evidence presented; appellate courts found sufficiency (implicit) | Claim presented in habeas application; not adjudicated in record provided |
| 4) Ineffective assistance — guilt phase (failure to locate/call alibi witnesses) | Counsel prevented or declined to call material alibi witnesses (Tracy Sowell, Thomas Spencer, Tom Perdue), prejudicing the defense and undermining reliability of conviction | On direct review the conviction was affirmed (implying appellate courts found evidence sufficient); State would assert no Strickland prejudice shown | Habeas application raises Strickland claim; no resolution shown in provided materials |
| 5) Juror misconduct / unapproved juror communication | Investigator Kay Langford privately spoke with prospective juror Paula Hamlet before voir dire; defense counsel did not report or secure inquiry; potential juror seated — presumed prejudicial | State would dispute effect or contest factual sufficiency of the affidavits; judge acknowledged receipt of affidavit but did not (in record provided) investigate further | Allegation is part of the habeas application; no final ruling in the record supplied |
| 6) Conflict of interest (trial counsel) | Counsel had close relationship with prosecutor and concurrently served as city prosecutor — counsel moved to withdraw but court refused; under Cuyler/Guylerr prejudice is presumed if actual conflict affected representation | State will contend no actual conflict established or no adverse effect shown | Claim raised in application; record shows counsel asked to withdraw but no resolution provided here |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1995) (federal actual‑innocence gateway standard for otherwise barred habeas claims)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1986) (cause‑and‑prejudice framework for procedural default; discussion of miscarriage‑of‑justice exception)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1992) (standard for relief in death‑penalty contexts; discussion of evidentiary showing required)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1993) (recognition of actual‑innocence claims and limits on habeas relief)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Crammer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1954) (private communications with jurors during trial are presumptively prejudicial)