Beaman v. Freesmeyer
2017 IL App (4th) 160527
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- In 1993 Jennifer Lockmiller was murdered. Alan Beaman was investigated, charged, tried, and convicted of first-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence (fingerprints on an alarm clock, time-trial evidence, neighbor testimony, and relationship history). He was sentenced to 50 years.
- Evidence concerning an alternative suspect, Larbi John Murray (drug dealer, history of domestic violence, steroid use, an incomplete polygraph), was not disclosed to Beaman’s trial counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court held that nondisclosure violated due process and vacated Beaman’s conviction in 2008; the State declined to retry and later certified his innocence and he was pardoned.
- Beaman sued former Normal police officers Freesmeyer, Warner, and Zayas and the Town of Normal in state court (malicious prosecution, IIED, conspiracy, respondeat superior, indemnification). Defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding prosecutors—not the officers—made the decision to prosecute and there was no evidence officers pressured prosecutors or knowingly provided false information. Beaman appealed.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) to establish the commenced-or-continued element of malicious prosecution against a police officer, plaintiff must show the officer pressured or exerted influence on the prosecutor’s decision or made knowing misstatements relied on by the prosecutor; and (2) Beaman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to that showing for Freesmeyer, Warner, or Zayas. Other claims (IIED, conspiracy, respondeat superior, indemnification) failed because they depended on the malicious-prosecution claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers ‘‘commenced or continued’’ the prosecution for malicious-prosecution purposes | Beaman: officers played a "significant role" (investigative leadership, time trials, withholding Murray evidence, grand-jury testimony), so that satisfies the commencement element | Defendants: mere investigation or providing reports is not enough; plaintiff must show pressure/influence on prosecutors or knowing misstatements that caused the prosecution | Held: To hold officers liable, plaintiff must show officer pressured/exerted influence on prosecutor’s decision or made knowing misstatements relied on by prosecutor; Beaman did not meet this burden. |
| Whether Freesmeyer exerted undue influence or knowingly falsified evidence | Beaman: Freesmeyer doctored time trials, lied to grand jury, pushed prosecution, and moved to prosecutor’s office to influence the case | Freesmeyer: prosecutors (Reynard, Souk) decided to prosecute; no evidence he pressured them or knowingly lied to induce prosecution; his time trials and testimony were legitimately investigatory | Held: No evidence Freesmeyer pressured prosecutors or knowingly lied; summary judgment for Freesmeyer affirmed. |
| Whether Warner suppressed or buried material exculpatory Murray evidence (polygraph report) causing prosecution | Beaman: Warner buried the polygraph report; that evidence was material and would have pointed to Murray as alternative suspect | Warner: No proof he pressured prosecutors or knowingly provided falsehoods; prosecutors already knew about Murray’s questionable character and polygraph incompletion would not have changed decision | Held: Polygraph was inconclusive; no evidence Warner’s conduct caused prosecutors to proceed; summary judgment for Warner affirmed. |
| Whether Zayas (supervisor) influenced decision to prosecute | Beaman: Zayas supervised detectives, participated in May 1994 meeting, and allowed a "half-baked" case to proceed | Zayas: No evidence he pressured prosecutors or made knowing false statements to induce prosecution | Held: No evidence of pressure or knowing misstatements by Zayas; summary judgment for Zayas affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (Ill. 2008) (Illinois Supreme Court: nondisclosure of Murray-related evidence violated due process and required vacatur of conviction)
- Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2015) (Seventh Circuit: affirmed summary judgment on §1983 claims; officers did not falsify time-trial evidence and were entitled to qualified immunity for failure to turn over some Murray-related material)
- Frye v. O'Neill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (discussed "significant role" language in malicious-prosecution context)
- Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504 (Ill. 1996) (elements of malicious prosecution under Illinois law)
- Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2017) (a police officer cannot be liable for malicious prosecution absent allegations of pressure/influence on prosecutors or knowing misstatements to the prosecutor)
- Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussed chain-of-causation limits on malicious-prosecution claims against police)
- Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (court examined prosecutor affidavits that officers did not influence charging decision)
- Kim v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. App. 3d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (observed lack of evidence that detectives engineered prosecution; discussed causation issues)
- Denton v. Allstate Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (private party not liable for malicious prosecution absent pressure, direction, or knowingly false information to police)