150 So. 3d 1111
Fla.2014Background
- Beach Community Bank sued the City of Freeport alleging the City negligently failed to verify the authenticity and adequacy of a developer’s letter of credit and the developer’s bank, exposing the Bank to loss.
- The City moved to dismiss, asserting no duty of care and that any additional investigative efforts would challenge the City’s discretionary, planning-level decisions protected by sovereign immunity.
- The First District exercised certiorari jurisdiction and held the City entitled to sovereign immunity as a matter of law, treating the dispute as a discretionary/planning-level decision.
- This Court had recently quashed a Third DCA certiorari decision in Rodriguez for improperly using certiorari to resolve factual disputes; Beach Community Bank was stayed pending that disposition.
- After Rodriguez was resolved, the Court noted the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 was amended to permit interlocutory review of nonfinal orders deciding entitlement to sovereign immunity when the question is a pure legal one.
- The Supreme Court quashed the First District only to the extent it relied on Rodriguez’s certiorari route, accepted that the issue here is a pure legal question covered by the amended Rule 9.130, and remanded for proceedings consistent with that rule while affirming that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity on the presented question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s nonfinal denial of sovereign immunity is reviewable interlocutorily | Bank: denial should be reviewable because City’s immunity question is a pure legal issue and suitable for immediate review | City: certiorari was appropriate in First DCA; alternatively, interlocutory review should be permitted where immunity turns on pure law | Court: Denied certiorari basis (Rodriguez path improper) but accepted interlocutory review under amended Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 for pure legal sovereign-immunity questions |
| Whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity for allegedly failing to investigate a letter of credit | Bank: City’s alleged negligence in investigation was operational, not discretionary, and thus not immune | City: enforcement and investigation levels are discretionary, planning-level policy decisions immune from suit | Court: Held City’s decision not to allocate resources to investigate authenticity/solvency was discretionary/planning-level and entitled to sovereign immunity |
| Proper procedural mechanism for review of nonfinal immunity determinations | Bank: implicit—use appellate review to resolve law questions | City: use interlocutory appellate review under amended Rule 9.130 rather than certiorari | Court: Approved applying amended Rule 9.130 prospectively to allow interlocutory review of pure legal immunity questions; remanded consistency with rule |
| Retroactivity of applying new appellate-rule amendment | Bank: sought benefit of review | City: argued entitlement to new rule | Court: Applied amendment to this case (majority); one justice dissented on retroactivity grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So.3d 400 (Fla. 2013) (quashed Third DCA’s use of certiorari to decide immunity where material factual disputes existed)
- Miami-Dade County v. Rodriguez, 67 So.3d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (Third DCA decision relied on by First DCA below)
- Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So.3d 359 (Fla. 2012) (recognized interlocutory review for individual immunity via a narrow amendment to rule 9.130)
- Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1985) (municipal decisions about enforcement priority and resource allocation are discretionary and immune)
- Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1985) (distinguishes discretionary/planning functions from operational functions for immunity)
- Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1992) (approved immediate amendment of appellate rules to permit interlocutory review of immunity issues)
- Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.3d 1035 (Fla. 2009) (describes functional purpose of discretionary-vs-operational test)
- Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. 656 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1995) (discusses operational vs. discretionary distinctions relevant to immunity)