803 S.E.2d 329
Va.2017Background
- The Rhoads family applied for and received a Certificate of Compliance from Richmond County zoning administrator Quicke for a two-story detached garage on Nov. 18, 2013; they completed the garage in June 2014 at ~ $27,000 cost.
- A later zoning administrator, Quesenberry, determined the garage violated Richmond County Zoning Ordinance §2-3-6 because the garage was taller than the primary dwelling; a written notice of violation issued Sept. 24, 2014.
- The Rhoadses appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), arguing their rights had vested under Va. Code § 15.2-2311(C) due to reliance on the zoning administrator’s written determination; the BZA denied relief.
- The Rhoadses then petitioned the Richmond County Circuit Court for certiorari; the County Board of Supervisors also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to require removal or alteration of the garage.
- The circuit court held § 15.2-2311(C) applied, found the Rhoadses’ rights had vested (more than 60 days had passed and the Rhoadses materially changed position in good-faith reliance), reversed the BZA, and denied the Board’s requested relief.
- The Board appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, challenging whether (1) an allegedly void zoning approval could trigger § 15.2-2311(C); (2) the Certificate qualified as a “determination”; and (3) the statute binds reviewing bodies (BZA/Board/courts) as well as subsequent administrative officers.
Issues
| Issue | Rhoadses' Argument | Board's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a zoning administrator’s written approval that violates the zoning ordinance can vest rights under Va. Code § 15.2-2311(C) | § 15.2-2311(C) creates a vesting exception; reliance on the written approval vested rights despite the underlying ordinance violation | An approval that plainly violates the ordinance is void ab initio and cannot give rise to vesting | Statute is a remedial legislative exception to the common-law rule; approval can vest rights under § 15.2-2311(C) when statutory prerequisites met |
| Whether the Certificate of Compliance constitutes a "written order, requirement, decision or determination" under § 15.2-2311(C) | The signed Certificate is a final written determination approving the plans and thus fits the statutory language | The Certificate did not explicitly reference the contested issue (height) and is not a § 15.2-2311(C) determination | The Certificate is a final written determination by the zoning administrator and satisfies the statute |
| Whether § 15.2-2311(C) only binds subsequent zoning administrators (not BZA/Board/courts) | The statute’s remedial purpose requires that BZA, Board, and courts consider vesting when reviewing violations; the administrator’s act binds the principal (Board) | The statute limits only later administrative officers, not bodies like planning commissions or BZA | § 15.2-2311(C) must be considered and enforced by BZA/Board/courts when prerequisites are satisfied; the administrator’s act binds the Board as principal |
| Whether prerequisites for vesting were met (60 days elapsed; material change in good-faith reliance) | More than 60 days passed and the Rhoadses spent ~$27,000 to build the garage in reliance on the Certificate | N/A (disputed antecedent issues) | Prerequisites satisfied: >60 days elapsed and Rhoadses materially changed position in good-faith reliance |
Key Cases Cited
- Blacksburg v. Price, 221 Va. 168 (recognizing prior rule that permits issued in violation of zoning are void)
- WANV, Inc. v. Houff, 219 Va. 57 (same)
- Segaloff v. City of Newport News, 209 Va. 259 (same)
- Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 275 Va. 232 (discussing § 15.2-2311(C) vesting for otherwise impermissible uses)
- James v. City of Falls Church, 280 Va. 31 (distinguishing interpretations from final determinations under § 15.2-2311(C))
- Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk, 285 Va. 340 (holding a cash receipt was not a § 15.2-2311(C) determination)
- Manu v. GEICO Cas. Co., 293 Va. 371 (principle that remedial statutes are liberally construed)