790 S.E.2d 460
Va.2016Background
- Under the Virginia Highway Corporation Act (Code § 56-535 et seq.) the State Corporation Commission (SCC) may approve or revise tolls for privately owned toll roads under Code § 56-542(D); the Commission approved initial and substituted tolls for the Dulles Greenway, including increases approved in 2007 effective through 2012.
- The General Assembly added Code § 56-542(I) in 2008, prescribing automatic annual toll increases (CPI+1%, GDP change, or 2.8%) effective Jan 1, 2013–Jan 1, 2020, which the operator TRIP II invoked in 2012–2013 to increase tolls for the Greenway.
- Delegate Ramadan (and later the Loudoun County Board) filed complaints under § 56-542(D) seeking investigation and reduction of the Greenway tolls; SCC approved TRIP II’s § 56-542(I) increase and separately initiated a § 56-542(D) investigation into the existing tolls.
- A hearing examiner found § 56-542(I) superseded § 56-542(D) for 2013–2020 but nonetheless evaluated the D-criteria and recommended limited reduction only for some truck off-peak tolls; the SCC concluded its investigation without substituting new tolls under § 56-542(D).
- On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia assumed (without deciding) § 56-542(D) applied, but held the SCC did not abuse its discretion in declining to substitute new tolls after finding existing tolls met § 56-542(D)’s three statutory criteria.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Did the SCC misapply § 56-542(D) by treating substitution as discretionary so long as existing tolls met the statutory minima? | Ramadan/Board: SCC must determine whether new rates ought to be substituted — not only whether they are required; SCC erred by effectively requiring a showing that substitution was mandatory. | TRIP II/SCC: § 56-542(D) uses "may," granting the SCC discretion; it properly investigated and exercised discretion to retain the rates. | Court: Affirmed SCC — § 56-542(D) is permissive and SCC did not misapply it. |
| 2. Does § 56-542(I) preclude SCC from substituting tolls under § 56-542(D) during 2013–2020? | Ramadan/Board: § 56-542(D) controls and allows review/substitution despite (I). | TRIP II: § 56-542(I) controls 2013–2020 and limits SCC to increases prescribed therein. | Court: Assumed without deciding § 56-542(D) applied and resolved case on that basis; did not decide the preclusion question. |
| 3. Did SCC err in finding the existing tolls "will not materially discourage use" (D(2))? | Ramadan/Board: Screenline/market-share analysis shows significant diversion — tolls materially discourage use. | TRIP II/Staff: Regression and level-of-service analyses show inelastic demand and no material discouragement; SCC credited this evidence. | Court: SCC’s factual finding has evidentiary support; no reversible error. |
| 4. Did SCC err in finding existing tolls provide "no more than a reasonable return" (D(3))? | Ramadan/Board: SCC improperly equated lack of partner distributions with reasonableness of return; SCC failed to assess reasonableness of TRIP II’s return. | TRIP II/Staff: Evidence showed TRIP II never earned a return; reduced tolls proposed by Ramadan would jeopardize debt service and operations. | Court: SCC’s finding was supported by evidence (operating losses, debt-service shortfall); no reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 284 Va. 726, 735 S.E.2d 684 (Va. 2012) (Commission’s broad discretion in utility ratemaking)
- BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 289 Va. 375, 770 S.E.2d 458 (Va. 2015) (deference to tribunal expertise)
- Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm’n, 277 Va. 509, 675 S.E.2d 458 (Va. 2009) (Commission decisions entitled to respect)
- Sauder v. Ferguson, 289 Va. 449, 771 S.E.2d 664 (Va. 2015) (ordinary meaning of "may" as permissive)
- Small v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 286 Va. 119, 747 S.E.2d 817 (Va. 2013) ("may" prima facie permissive)
- Advanced Towing Co. v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 280 Va. 187, 694 S.E.2d 621 (Va. 2010) (statutory construction of permissive terms)
- GTE South Inc. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., Inc., 259 Va. 338, 527 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 2000) (weight of evidence and factfinding by agency)
- Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc., 292 Va. 165, 788 S.E.2d 237 (Va. 2016) (approbate-reprobate principle in litigation positions)
- Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1944) (rates must allow recovery of operating costs and reasonable return)
- Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679 (U.S. 1923) (investors entitled to a reasonable return)
- City of Portsmouth v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 141 Va. 44, 126 S.E. 366 (Va. 1925) (constitutional constraints on rate reductions)
