Bd. of Liquor Commissioners for Balt. City v. Austin
158 A.3d 1025
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2017Background
- Turner’s (Federal Hill) ceased operations in July 2009. The Board approved transfer of its Baltimore City liquor license to contract purchasers on July 23, 2009.
- Under the applicable statute (Art. 2B § 10-504(d) / § 10-503(d)), a license expires 180 days after cessation of business unless (i) a transfer/assignment application is approved or pending, (ii) a §10-506 application is pending/approved, or (iii) a written hardship extension is filed within 180 days; hardship extensions may extend life to up to 360 days.
- The purchasers did not complete the transfer within 180 days and instead renewed the license annually; they filed a hardship extension many years later (2013/2014).
- The Board initially treated the license as viable (citing estoppel from renewals and prior Board action), but on remand reversed and concluded the license had expired as a matter of law because the approved transfer was not completed within 180 days and no timely hardship extension tolled the statutory period.
- The circuit court reversed the Board, holding that the statute’s exceptions for approved or pending transfers and the renewals meant the license did not expire; the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Board’s determination that the license had expired.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Baltimore City liquor license expires as a matter of law if an approved transfer is not completed within 180 days after cessation of business | Association: Statute unambiguously mandates expiration 180 days after cessation unless a pending/approved transfer or a timely hardship request tolled the period; extensions/renewals outside statutory authority are invalid | Board/Association: Approved transfer did not yield completion within 180 days and no timely hardship extension was filed; renewals do not reset the 180-day clock | Held: License expired; approved-but-uncompleted transfer and later renewals do not revive license absent timely statutory tolling or hardship extension |
| Whether annual renewals or the passage of time with an intended transfer pending toll or preserve the 180-day expiration period | Purchasers: Successive renewals and Board’s prior acceptance of fees tolled the 180 days and preserved the license (relying in part on dictum in Yim) | Association/Board: Renewals do not operate as statutory tolling of the 180-day completion requirement; statute’s tolling is limited to filing/approval of transfer/assignment or timely hardship request | Held: Renewals do not toll or reset the 180-day requirement; tolling occurs only as provided by statute (pending/approved transfer awaiting Board action or a timely hardship request) |
| Whether equitable estoppel prevents the government (Board) from enforcing the statutory expiration where its agents accepted renewals | Purchasers: Board’s conduct (accepting renewals, prior statements) estops enforcement now | Association/Board: Governmental estoppel does not apply to bind the Board against clear statutory commands; agency cannot be estopped by agent acts contradicting statute | Held: Government estoppel inapplicable; Board cannot be estopped to ignore clear statutory expiration based on unauthorized acts of agents |
| Whether the Board could revisit its prior decision after judicial review/remand | Purchasers: Board was barred from reconsidering the issue because substantial record already existed and prior decision had been made | Board/Association: Remand and changed legal interpretation justified reconsideration; agency may correct legal error | Held: Board was permitted/dutied to reconsider its prior legal interpretation on remand and reverse its earlier conclusion where it concluded the prior interpretation was legally erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Yim, LLC v. Tuzeer, 211 Md. App. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (discussed tolling and hardship-extension interplay; does not support renewals-as-tolling beyond statutory text)
- Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158 (Md. 2001) (governmental estoppel limited; agency not estopped from enforcing statutory mandate)
- ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 344 Md. 85 (Md. 1997) (agency may seek recoupment despite earlier acceptance of payments; limited estoppel against government)
- Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1984) (federal precedent limiting estoppel against government agencies)
- Board of County Comm’rs of Cecil Cty. v. Racine, 24 Md. App. 435 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (agency may correct prior erroneous legal determinations; res judicata inapplicable to perpetuate illegality)
- Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486 (Md. 1975) (misinterpretations of law by an agency are arbitrary and may be corrected)
