837 S.E.2d 23
S.C.2019Background
- Father (Stacey) died in 2013; his parents (Laverne and Pansy) had a previously close relationship with the children but contact declined after disputes with the mother, Tammie.
- From late 2015 until suit, the grandparents had little to no contact; they sued in family court in July 2016 under S.C. Code § 63-3-530(A)(33) seeking court-ordered grandparent visitation.
- Family court granted visitation in November 2017; Tammie appealed, raising a facial and as-applied Due Process challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment and Troxel.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina held the statute constitutional, found the grandparents satisfied the statutory elements (including that Tammie unreasonably deprived visitation), and concluded Tammie’s intentional deceptive conduct and contempt produced a ‘‘compelling circumstance.’'
- The Court affirmed but modified the visitation plan to less intrusive, non-overnight, largely Myrtle Beach–based visits (monthly visits, weekly phone contact, one half-day Christmas outing) and remanded for a detailed order; the Court warned overnight visits could be reconsidered if Tammie continues to frustrate rebuilding the relationship.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tammie) | Defendant's Argument (Grandparents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Is § 63-3-530(A)(33) unconstitutional under Troxel? | Statute infringes parental due process; term ‘compelling circumstances’ is vague and allows unguided judicial second-guessing. | Statute includes presumption that parental decision is in child’s best interest, requires deference and a finding that visitation won’t interfere. | Statute is constitutional as written and may be narrowly applied to protect parental rights. |
| 2) Did Tammie ‘‘unreasonably deprive’’ the grandparents of visitation? | She claimed she was willing to allow contact and had legitimate scheduling concerns. | She repeatedly ignored calls, refused scheduling, and thwarted visits, effectively denying access. | Court found Tammie unreasonably deprived grandparents of visitation. |
| 3) Did grandparents prove ‘‘compelling circumstances’’ by clear and convincing evidence? | No significant harm shown; death alone insufficient; statutory standard should be narrowly construed. | Tammie’s intentional deception, contempt and forcing children into intermediary roles harmed the relationship and justified intervention. | Yes—mother’s deceptive conduct and resulting harm to children constituted compelling circumstances. |
| 4) Was the family court’s visitation schedule appropriate? | Mother sought reasonable limits (no Pamplico overnights; visits should not disrupt children’s activities). | Grandparents sought more frequent and overnight visits to rebuild ties. | Original schedule was excessive; Court modified to honor reasonable parental limits while granting non-overnight, monthly visits and remanded for details; overnight visits left open for future consideration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Due Process protects fit parent’s visitation decisions; struck overly broad nonparent visitation statute)
- Camburn v. Smith, 355 S.C. 574 (2003) (South Carolina requires deference to fit parent’s visitation decisions)
- Marquez v. Caudill, 376 S.C. 229 (2008) (in unique circumstances, maintaining ties after a parent’s death can be a compelling circumstance)
- Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 (2018) (family-court substantive decisions reviewed de novo)
- Grantham v. Weatherford, 425 S.C. 111 (Ct. App. 2018) (upheld extensive visitation where grandparents had parent-like role prior to parent’s death)
- Brown v. Key, 425 S.C. 490 (Ct. App. 2019) (recognized reasonableness of parental limitations such as supervised visitation)
- Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) (significant harm from denial of grandparent visitation can be a compelling circumstance)
- Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998) (interpreted nonparent visitation statute to require a showing of harm before awarding visitation)