Bayne v. Bayne
302 Neb. 858
Neb.2019Background
- Divorce decree (consent) awarded the marital home to Brittney and required her to "have the home refinanced into her own name within 12 months"; if she was "unable" to do so within 12 months, the house was to be listed for sale and proceeds split equally; the decree said the refinancing requirement was "enforceable by the contempt powers" of the court.
- Brittney obtained lender approval to refinance within 12 months but the bank scheduled closing about 13 months after entry of the decree; she closed the refinance on January 13, 2017.
- Brittney repaired and improved the house (including fixing damage she attributed to Mick), paid mortgage and closing costs, and later sold the house in June 2017 for $194,000, netting about $44,998.
- Mick filed a declaratory judgment action seeking one-half of the sale proceeds, arguing the forced-sale clause was triggered because the refinance was not "completed" within 12 months.
- The district court found Brittney was "able" to refinance within 12 months (obtained approval) and thus the forced-sale clause did not apply; the court therefore denied Mick relief. Mick appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mick) | Defendant's Argument (Brittney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether forced-sale clause was triggered by failure to complete refinance within 12 months | The decree requires completion of refinancing within 12 months; closing at ~13 months triggers forced sale and equal split | Refinance requirement was satisfied because she obtained lender approval within 12 months and was not "unable" to refinance; delay in closing was not willful and was caused by lender/timing | Court held forced-sale clause applies only if she was "unable" to refinance within 12 months; approval within 12 months meant clause not triggered |
| Whether the court may consider extrinsic evidence of parties' subjective intent | Mick contended interpretation should be from four corners only; no extrinsic intent matters | Brittney relied on facts showing approval within 12 months and good-faith efforts; district court considered facts but appellate review is de novo | Court reaffirmed decree interpretation is a question of law from the four corners, but found no reliance on improper extrinsic evidence and reached same legal conclusion independently |
| Whether contempt could have been used to compel refinance if Brittney willfully refused after being able to do so | Mick argued the contempt provision is meaningless unless forced sale also triggers on mere noncompletion | Brittney argued contempt remedy exists if she willfully refuses, while forced sale is reserved for inability to refinance | Court held contempt is available to address willful refusal; forced sale provision is appropriately limited to inability to refinance |
| Whether equity or ambiguity principles require a different construction | Mick argued a strict construction would render the refinance requirement meaningless | Brittney argued equitable principles support a reasonable interpretation tolerating reasonable delay not caused by her | Court applied equitable principles: doubtful judgments get reasonable intendment; equity favors Brittney given good-faith approval and lack of willfulness |
Key Cases Cited
- Rice v. Webb, 287 Neb. 712, 844 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 2014) (meaning of a dissolution decree is a question of law determined from the four corners)
- Carlson v. Carlson, 299 Neb. 526, 909 N.W.2d 351 (Neb. 2018) (settlement agreement incorporated in decree is interpreted as part of the judgment)
- Kerndt v. Ronan, 236 Neb. 26, 458 N.W.2d 466 (Neb. 1990) (judgments construed to give effect to every part)
- Mihalyak v. Mihalyak, 11 Conn. App. 610, 529 A.2d 213 (Conn. App. 1987) (delays in refinancing are frequently tolerated when reasonable and not attributed to willful delay)
- McCullough v. McCullough, 299 Neb. 719, 910 N.W.2d 515 (Neb. 2018) (equitable considerations in interpreting dissolution decrees)