BAUMRUK v. State, 2012 Mo. LEXIS 94

Background

Baumruk, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the post-conviction denial under Rule 29.15.
History of multiple competency proceedings and a long series of prior proceedings culminating in a 2007 retrial and death sentence for killing his wife.
Post-conviction motion asserted numerous ineffective-assistance claims against competency hearing counsel, trial counsel, and appellate counsel.
Key factual disputes centered on Miranda and Sixth Amendment issues regarding statements Baumruk made to Buck, Glenn, and Salamon, and the use of those statements at trial.
Motion court conducted evidentiary hearings on several claims and denied relief, leading to this direct appeal under Missouri Supreme Court jurisdiction.
The Court affirmed the motion court’s denial, applying Strickland-based prejudice and reasonable-strategy standards for ineffective assistance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance of first competency hearing counsel	Baumruk argues prejudice from dismissal pursuit affecting refiling and outcome.	State contends dismissal mandate and refiling permissibility negate prejudice.	No prejudice; counsel's actions not outcome-determinative; no 29.15 relief.
Failure to suppress statements to social worker Buck	Statements to Buck violated Miranda/Sixth Amendment, warranting suppression.	Buck statements not custodial interrogation; privilege waived; no suppression needed.	Not clearly erroneous; statements not Miranda violation; no prejudice from counsel's handling.
Failure to suppress statements to Officer Glenn	Statements to Glenn were Miranda-violative and should have been suppressed.	Statements were voluntary; Miranda not violated; strategic choice not to suppress.	No error; statements voluntary; suppression not warranted; prejudice not shown.
Failure to obtain new CT/PET scans for competency mitigation	Recent scans could show brain-injury impact on executive function and impulse control, aiding incompetency defense.	Scans would be speculative and cumulative; proper evaluation requires clinical assessment, not imaging alone.	No entitlement to evidentiary hearing; decision reasonable; scans would be cumulative and not probative.
Failure to call treating doctors as witnesses	Fisher and Perkowski could have offered credible, disinterested testimony supporting incompetence.	Testimony would be cumulative, less probative, and risked undercutting strategy; changes in condition reduce relevance.	No ineffective assistance; strategic trial decisions supported by record; not clearly erroneous.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes standard for ineffective assistance)
State v. Driver, 912 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. banc 1995) (motion-court prejudice test for post-conviction hearings)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (prejudice not shown where outcome unaffected)
Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704 (Mo. banc 2009) (cumulative evidence and trial strategy considerations)
Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004) (mental impairment evidence as mitigating factor)
Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 (Mo. banc 2008) (trial strategy in witness selection remains virtually unchallengeable)
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. _ (2012) (custody analysis in custodial interrogation under Miranda)
State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. banc 1982) (waiver of physician-patient privilege when mental condition at issue)
State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485 (Mo. banc 2000) (impeachment and prejudice standards in post-conviction context)