Bauer v. Mavi Marmara, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55636

Bauer sues under 18 U.S.C. § 962 (Neutrality Act) claiming vessels were outfitted to breach the Gaza blockade and aid Hamas, seeking forfeiture shares for himself as informer.
Defendants include several vessels alleged to be used in supporting hostilities against Israel amid the 2006 blockade context.
Plaintiff asserts that organizations in the U.S. and abroad raised funds used to equip defendant ships; he contends the statute provides an informer’s remedy with a share of forfeited proceeds.
The government moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the Neutrality Act contains no private cause of action and the court lacks standing.
Court analyzes subject-matter jurisdiction and whether a private right of action can be implied under historical informer statutes and modern standing doctrine.
Court dismisses the case, holding § 962 lacks an express private cause of action and there is no implied private remedy; case ends with dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 962 provides a private cause of action	Bauer contends informer rights exist under § 962.	Defendants argue no express private right of action exists and no implied remedy should be read in.	No express or implied private right; dismissal affirmed.
Whether Bauer has standing to sue under an informer statute	Bauer seeks recovery as an informer benefiting from the statute.	Defendant argues no concrete injury under Article III standing exists.	Standing insufficient under Article III; pleadings do not show concrete injury but historical context supports dismissal.
Whether the Private Right of Action can be Implied under the Neutrality Act	Implied private action should be read from historical informer practice.	Implying a private remedy would be inappropriate absent clear congressional intent.	No implied private cause of action; statute lacks clear intent to create one.
Whether private enforcement would raise foreign relations concerns	Private action could supplement government enforcement.	Private enforcement intrudes on executive/foreign affairs discretion.	Court cautions against private actions in foreign-relations matters absent explicit congressional guidance.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (statutory silence does not imply private rights of action)
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (private rights must be implied from congressional intent and statute text)
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (historical paradigms used to interpret statutes; caution in implying rights)
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (foreign relations power lies with the executive; courts defer in lacking clear congressional intent)
Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) (early informer statutes contemplated private actions for penalties)
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (footnote discussion on qui tam actions acknowledging private suits in some contexts)