447 P.3d 510
Or. Ct. App.2019Background
- Stephanie Bates signed a two-and-a-half page "Midwife Disclosure and Consent" form while ~4 months pregnant at Andaluz Waterbirth Center, containing a general arbitration clause immediately above her signature line.
- The form describes services for mother and newborn (delivery, newborn exam, postpartum visits) but consistently addresses the signatory as "I/you" and the client as the pregnant person; it does not identify the expected child as a party.
- Olivia Bates was born at Andaluz, transported to a hospital, and died two days later from birth-related complications.
- Olivia's father, as personal representative of Olivia’s estate, sued for wrongful death; defendants moved to dismiss and compel arbitration relying on the arbitration clause Stephanie signed.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding Stephanie’s signature did not effectively waive Olivia’s right to a jury trial; defendants appealed.
- The appellate court reviewed contract formation and interpretation under Oregon law and concluded the arbitration clause did not bind Olivia.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Olivia is bound by the arbitration clause Stephanie signed | Bates: The Midwife Disclosure does not purport to bind Olivia; no intent or notice to bind the child; wrongful death claim not a waiver | Andaluz: The form covered care for the newborn and Stephanie signed on Olivia’s behalf to obtain care, so Olivia is bound | Held: Olivia is not bound; document text/context show Stephanie did not sign for the child |
| Whether Olivia is an intended third‑party beneficiary bound by arbitration | Bates: Even as beneficiary, Olivia did not manifest assent; estate sued for wrongful death only | Andaluz: Olivia was an intended beneficiary of services, so arbitration can bind her | Held: Although Olivia was an intended beneficiary of care, she did not assent and thus was not bound by arbitration |
| Whether parental consent to medical care can waive child’s jury‑trial right | Bates: Parental consent to treatment is distinct and cannot waive the child’s constitutional jury right absent clear assent | Andaluz: Parental act of consenting to care encompassed agreeing to arbitration for claims arising from that care | Held: Court did not find parental consent sufficient here to waive the child’s right absent clear contractual manifestation |
| Whether an agreement to arbitrate existed as to Olivia under ordinary contract rules | Bates: No meeting of minds or objective manifestation that the child would be bound | Andaluz: Signing demonstrated intent to cover disputes arising from the care provided to mother and child | Held: No mutual assent for Olivia; court applied Yogman steps and ended analysis at clear text level |
Key Cases Cited
- DeLashmutt v. Parker Group Investments, LLC, 276 Or. App. 42 (Or. Ct. App.) (contract‑interpretation framework for arbitration questions)
- Drury v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 245 Or. App. 217 (Or. Ct. App.) (third‑party beneficiary may be bound only if manifested assent)
- Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or. 358 (Or. 1997) (steps for contract interpretation; start with text/context)
- AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (U.S. 1986) (arbitration is a matter of contract and cannot be compelled absent agreement)
- Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.) (third parties cannot be bound absent assent)