Baruno v. Slane
151 Conn.App. 386
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Baruno and Baruno sued Slane and firm for legal malpractice arising from representation of Tsois-adjacent property dispute.
- Plaintiffs alleged failure to examine deeds/map and to rely on adverse possession instead of deeded restrictive covenants.
- Court found Slane departed from standard of care, but damages not proximately caused by malpractice.
- Trial court awarded $620,817 for diminution in value, remediation costs, and certain fees; damages for other items rejected.
- Court concluded damages could not be proven within the relevant 16-month period (Mar. 19, 2006 – July 16, 2007) and reversed the award.
- Case remanded with directions to render judgment in favor of defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proximate causation of damages in legal malpractice | Baruno argues damages were proximately caused by Slane's malpractice | Slane argues damages not proximately caused, or insufficient proof | Damages not proximately caused; reversal warranted. |
| Appropriate measure and scope of damages | Damages should include full Dr. Quack-style recovery | Damages restricted to period of malpractice | Damage measure limited to March 19, 2006–July 16, 2007; improper to include broader damages. |
| Proper basis for injunctive relief and its impact on damages | Restrictive covenants would have yielded contractual injunction; damages should reflect that | Discretion of trial court governs injunction; covenants limited to parcel Y | Injunction based on covenants would not have extended to parcels or timing; damages not recoverable beyond the deemed period. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farrish-LeDuc, 275 Conn. 748 (2005) (causation elements in legal malpractice; general rule of recovery)
- Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765 (2005) (case-within-a-case approach; causal proof in malpractice)
- Gurguis v. Frankel, 93 Conn. App. 162 (2006) (causal relation essential; proximate cause a fundamental element)
- Cammarota v. Guerrera, 148 Conn. App. 743 (2014) (causation in fact; limits to liability)
- Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 (1995) (proximate cause defined as substantial factor; fact-intensive)
- Welles v. Lichaj, 136 Conn. App. 347 (2012) (injunction discretionary; equities and timing matter)