Barton v. Clancy
632 F.3d 9
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Barton, an African-American longtime firefighter, faced conflict with Mayor Clancy and became a vocal critic of City policies and various lawsuits against the City.
- Barton served on the Lynn Parks Commission (1996-2006) and was later hired as interim, then full-time boys' basketball coach for a City high school.
- In 2006 Clancy declined to reappoint Barton to the Parks Commission, citing no request for reappointment and uncertainty over Barton's replacement.
- Clancy publicly criticized Barton’s disability retirement and questioned his fitness to coach, sending critical letters to school officials and sharing them with the press.
- Clancy also initiated investigations into Barton's taxes and disability pension, creating a public controversy that affected Barton’s coaching role and perceived job security.
- Barton filed suit in May 2007 alleging state-law disability harassment under ch. 151B, § 4, and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim; the district court granted summary judgment for Clancy on both claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barton is a handicapped person under ch. 151B. | Barton was regarded as impaired and limited in working across jobs. | No impairment or regard-to-impairment finding; not a handicapped person under ch. 151B. | Yes; Barton could be viewed as 'handicapped' under ch. 151B due to Clancy's perceptions of impairment affecting work. |
| Whether Clancy was Barton’s employer for ch. 151B purposes. | Clancy had control over Barton's employment aspects and liability extends. | Clancy was not Barton's employer; authority over coaching decisions rests with superintendent and school committee. | Clancy was not Barton's employer. |
| Whether § 4(4A) allows liability for interference with rights by non-employers. | § 4(4A) applies to any person who interferes with protected rights, regardless of employer status. | Limiting interpretation to employer or 'employee' contexts; non-employer liability unclear. | Assuming liability absent an employment relationship, but not resolved to Baron's benefit; generally not clearly established here. |
| Whether Clancy interfered with a protected right under ch. 151B. | Clancy's conduct (letters, investigations, public statements) interfered with Barton's right to work in a harassment-free environment. | No harassment occurred at Barton’s workplace; actions occurred off-site and were not workplace-based. | Clancy did not plainly interfere with a protected right under ch. 151B in a way governing this claim. |
| Whether Clancy's conduct violated clearly established First Amendment law and the applicability of qualified immunity. | Challenged acts chilled protected speech in retaliation for First Amendment activity. | The law was not clearly established; qualified immunity applies due to lack of clearly established right in this context. | Clancy is entitled to qualified immunity; the right was not clearly established as of 2006-2007 for non-reappointment or harassment in this context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.2009) (employer analysis under Title VII informs ch. 151B interpretation)
- Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (S. Ct.1972) (unemployment benefits cannot be denied for protected speech; rights analysis extends beyond employment)
- Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999) (volunteer removal retaliation analysis; not clearly established in 1994)
- Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.1993) (First Amendment protection for non-tenured employees and retaliation claims)
- Umbehr v. City of Lincoln, 518 U.S. 668 (U.S.1996) (First Amendment protections apply to government contractors and related contexts)
- Rivera-Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87 (1st Cir.2004) (First Amendment retaliation standard in § 1983 context without requiring employment relation)